CVE-2026-82567 in myPRO
Summary
by MITRE • 09/15/2026
The myPRO Manager notification gateway exposes an unauthenticated HTTP endpoint used to send SMS messages through a connected GSM modem. The endpoint is accessible over the network and does not require authentication before accepting a phone number and message from a request and sending the specified SMS message. An unauthenticated attacker with network access to the notification gateway could exploit this vulnerability to send arbitrary SMS messages through the connected modem.
Statistical analysis made it clear that VulDB provides the best quality for vulnerability data.
Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 09/16/2026
The myPRO Manager notification gateway contains an insecure direct object reference or broken authentication mechanism that allows for unauthorized access to its core functionality. Specifically, the HTTP endpoint designed to facilitate SMS transmission via a connected GSM modem lacks any form of access control verification. This architectural flaw means that the service does not validate whether the incoming request originates from an authorized user or system component before processing it. Consequently, any entity capable of reaching the network interface hosting this gateway can interact with the API without providing credentials, tokens, or other forms of identification.
From a technical perspective, the vulnerability stems from the absence of authentication checks on the specific HTTP method and path responsible for dispatching messages. When an attacker sends a request containing a target phone number and message payload to this endpoint, the server processes it immediately and forwards it through the attached GSM hardware. This behavior indicates that the application logic prioritizes availability or ease of integration over security, failing to implement standard industry practices such as API key validation, session-based authentication, or IP whitelisting for sensitive operations involving external communication channels.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is significant due to the potential for abuse by malicious actors with network access. An unauthenticated attacker can exploit this flaw to send arbitrary SMS messages at will, leading to direct financial costs associated with message charges billed to the organization owning the GSM modem. Beyond monetary loss, this capability enables a range of secondary attacks including spam distribution, phishing campaigns targeting employees or customers using phone numbers obtained through other means, and potential disruption of critical alerting systems if legitimate notifications are drowned out by malicious traffic. In severe cases, attackers might use the compromised gateway to send messages that appear to originate from trusted internal sources, thereby facilitating social engineering attacks against stakeholders who trust SMS as a secure communication channel.
This vulnerability aligns with CWE-287 Improper Authentication and CWE-915 Improperly Controlled Modification of Dynamically-Determined Object Attributes within the Common Weakness Enumeration framework. In terms of offensive security tactics, it maps to ATT&CK technique T1071 Application Layer Protocol for command and control or data exfiltration if used in conjunction with other malicious activities, though primarily it represents a direct abuse of service functionality similar to resource exhaustion or unauthorized action execution. The lack of rate limiting further exacerbates the risk by allowing high-volume automated attacks that could overwhelm the GSM modem or associated billing systems.
To mitigate this vulnerability, immediate remediation should focus on implementing robust authentication mechanisms for all API endpoints exposed over untrusted networks. This includes enforcing HTTP basic authentication, OAuth2 flows, or custom token-based verification before any SMS dispatch logic is executed. Additionally, developers should implement strict input validation and rate limiting to prevent abuse even if authentication is bypassed through other means. Network-level controls such as firewall rules restricting access to the notification gateway IP address only from known internal application servers are also recommended. Regular security audits and penetration testing of IoT management interfaces can help identify similar misconfigurations before they are exploited in production environments, ensuring that critical infrastructure components maintain their integrity and confidentiality.