CVE-2026-85431 in essential-moos
Summary
by MITRE • 09/04/2026
MOOS essential-moos through version 10.0.1 contains an unauthenticated UDP packet injection vulnerability in pMOOSBridge when configured with UDPListen. Attackers can send crafted UDP packets to the configured port to inject arbitrary variables into the local MOOS community with spoofed source and community identifiers.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 09/04/2026
The vulnerability identified within MOOS essential-moos versions up through 10.0.1 represents a critical security flaw in the pMOOSBridge component, specifically when it is configured to utilize UDPListen for network communication. This architecture allows external entities to interact with the Mission Oriented Operating Suite (MOOS) community by sending data over User Datagram Protocol connections. The core issue stems from insufficient validation and authentication mechanisms within the bridge implementation, which fails to verify the origin or integrity of incoming packets before processing them as valid commands or state updates for the local MOOS environment.
From a technical perspective, this flaw enables unauthenticated UDP packet injection, allowing attackers to craft malicious datagrams that are accepted by the pMOOSBridge without any form of credential verification. The attacker can manipulate critical fields within these packets, specifically spoofing source identifiers and community IDs. By doing so, the injected data is treated as if it originated from a trusted internal node or belongs to an authorized community group. This bypasses logical access controls that might otherwise restrict who can modify specific variables or execute actions within the MOOS ecosystem, effectively granting unauthorized write access to sensitive system parameters.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe due to the nature of MOOS as a middleware often used in autonomous systems such as unmanned underwater vehicles and other robotic platforms. An attacker exploiting this flaw can inject arbitrary variables into the local MOOS community, potentially altering navigation commands, sensor data interpretations, or control logic. This could lead to unauthorized control over physical assets, causing erratic behavior, mission failure, or even catastrophic hardware damage if the injected values correspond to dangerous operational parameters such as depth limits, speed constraints, or actuator states. The ability to spoof identifiers further complicates incident response and forensic analysis, as logs may incorrectly attribute malicious actions to legitimate internal nodes.
This vulnerability aligns with Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) categories including CWE-287 Improper Authentication and CWE-918 Server-Side Request Forgery if the injected data triggers subsequent requests, though primarily it is classified under injection flaws where untrusted input influences control flow or state. In terms of the MITRE ATT&CK framework, this exploitation technique maps to T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter via network protocols and potentially T1136 Create Account if new community nodes are dynamically added through injected variables. The lack of encryption also exposes the communication channel to eavesdropping, although the primary risk here is active manipulation rather than passive interception.
To mitigate this vulnerability, organizations should immediately upgrade MOOS essential-moos to version 10.0.2 or later where these authentication checks have been implemented. For environments that cannot be patched instantly, network-level mitigations are recommended. This includes configuring firewalls to restrict UDP traffic on the pMOOSBridge port to only known and trusted IP addresses within a secure subnet. Additionally, implementing network segmentation can isolate MOOS-critical infrastructure from general-purpose networks, reducing the attack surface available to potential adversaries. It is also advisable to review configuration files to ensure that UDPListen is not exposed unnecessarily and to consider alternative communication protocols such as TCP with TLS encryption if real-time performance requirements allow for the associated overhead.