CVE-2026-90180 in Linux
Summary
by MITRE • 09/17/2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
block: mtip32xx: synchronize ioctls with device removal
The ioctl handlers only test REMOVE_PENDING before entering mtip_hw_ioctl(). Removal can set that bit immediately afterwards and free dd->port in mtip_hw_exit() while an ioctl still dereferences it. An already open block device can reach the handlers while del_gendisk() is in progress.
Serialize both native and compat ioctls with removal. Set REMOVE_PENDING before taking the mutex so new callers fail after an in-flight ioctl has drained, and hold the mutex until the port has been torn down.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 09/17/2026
The Linux kernel block layer driver for Micron MTIP32xx SSDs contains a concurrency flaw that arises from improper synchronization between device removal procedures and ongoing input-output control operations. This vulnerability specifically affects the mtip_hw_ioctl function, which handles various ioctl requests issued by user-space applications interacting with the storage device. The core issue lies in the race condition where the driver checks for a REMOVE_PENDING flag but fails to maintain exclusive access to critical data structures during the window between this check and the actual execution of hardware-specific commands.
When a system administrator or automated process initiates the removal of an MTIP32xx SSD, the kernel begins tearing down the device structure. The mtip_hw_exit function is responsible for freeing the port context associated with the drive. However, if an ioctl call is already in progress or enters the handler immediately after the REMOVE_PENDING flag is set but before the mutex lock is acquired by the removal routine, a use-after-free condition occurs. Specifically, the driver dereferences dd->port without ensuring that this pointer remains valid throughout the duration of the operation. This happens because del_gendisk may be in progress while an already open block device continues to issue commands through its file operations interface.
The technical flaw stems from insufficient serialization between the removal path and the ioctl handling path. The original implementation allowed new callers to proceed past the REMOVE_PENDING check before the driver had fully secured mutual exclusion via a mutex. Consequently, concurrent execution could lead to accessing freed memory when mtip_hw_exit releases resources while an ioctl handler is still utilizing them. This lack of atomicity in state transitions creates a window where stale pointers are dereferenced, potentially leading to kernel panic or arbitrary code execution depending on the heap layout and attacker control over adjacent allocations.
From a security perspective, this vulnerability aligns with CWE-416, Use After Free, as it involves accessing memory that has been deallocated due to improper lifecycle management of object references. In terms of adversarial tactics, this scenario maps to ATT&CK technique T1059, Command and Scripting Interpreter, specifically through the abuse of system-level interfaces like ioctls to trigger unintended kernel behavior. An attacker with local access who can open the block device file could potentially exploit this race condition to crash the system or escalate privileges if they can influence memory allocation patterns around the freed port structure.
The operational impact includes potential denial of service due to kernel oops or panic, which disrupts availability for all systems relying on that storage subsystem. In more severe cases where heap spraying techniques are employed alongside exploitation of the use-after-free condition, there is a risk of arbitrary code execution with kernel-level privileges. This compromises the integrity and confidentiality of data stored on the device as well as other processes running on the host system.
To mitigate this vulnerability, the fix implements strict serialization by setting the REMOVE_PENDING flag before acquiring the mutex that protects ioctl operations. This ensures that any new incoming ioctl requests will fail immediately if removal is underway, preventing them from entering critical sections where they might access invalid pointers. Furthermore, the driver now holds the mutex until the port has been completely torn down in mtip_hw_exit, guaranteeing that no concurrent threads can interfere with resource deallocation. Administrators should apply kernel updates containing this patch to restore safe operation of MTIP32xx devices and eliminate the race condition window. Regular maintenance of system packages is essential to address such low-level concurrency bugs before they can be leveraged in targeted attacks against enterprise infrastructure.