CVE-2026-92195 in Foglight for Databases
Summary
by MITRE • 11/04/2026
Quest Foglight for Databases loadEvolveLicense Directory Traversal Remote Code Execution Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on affected installations of Quest Foglight for Databases. Authentication is required to exploit this vulnerability.
The specific flaw exists within the loadEvolveLicense script. The issue results from the lack of proper validation of a user-supplied path prior to using it in file operations. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to execute code in the context of SYSTEM. Was ZDI-CAN-29232.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 11/04/2026
The identified security flaw resides within Quest Foglight for Databases, specifically affecting the loadEvolveLicense script component. This vulnerability is classified as a directory traversal issue that ultimately leads to remote code execution capabilities under specific conditions. The core technical deficiency stems from an insufficient validation mechanism applied to user-supplied path inputs before they are utilized in file system operations. When the application processes these paths without rigorous sanitization, it fails to adequately restrict access to intended directories or files, thereby allowing an attacker to manipulate the file path structure. This lack of input validation is a classic implementation error that permits navigation outside of expected boundaries within the server's file hierarchy.
From a technical perspective, this vulnerability aligns with CWE-22, which defines Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory. By exploiting the absence of proper checks on the supplied path parameter, an attacker can construct malicious input sequences that traverse up the directory tree using standard notation such as dot-dot-slash characters. This manipulation allows the application to access and potentially overwrite or execute files located in sensitive system directories rather than restricting operations to the designated license storage area. The severity of this flaw is significantly amplified by its potential impact on system privileges, as successful exploitation enables code execution within the context of the SYSTEM account. Achieving SYSTEM-level access represents a critical compromise of confidentiality, integrity, and availability, granting the attacker unrestricted control over the underlying operating system environment where Foglight for Databases is installed.
The operational implications of this vulnerability are severe due to its potential for remote code execution. Although authentication is required to exploit this flaw, which serves as an initial access barrier, it does not mitigate the risk entirely since legitimate users with valid credentials could be targeted through social engineering or credential theft. Once authenticated, an attacker can leverage the directory traversal weakness to place malicious scripts or binaries in locations that are executed by the system process. This capability allows for complete compromise of the host machine, facilitating further lateral movement within a network environment and potentially leading to data exfiltration or disruption of database monitoring services provided by Foglight. The requirement for authentication means this vulnerability is primarily relevant against insider threats or compromised user accounts rather than unauthenticated external attackers on the public internet.
In terms of threat modeling, this exploitation scenario maps directly to MITRE ATT&CK techniques related to Initial Access and Privilege Escalation. Specifically, it relates to Valid Accounts under the Initial Access tactic, as authentication is a prerequisite for triggering the flaw. Furthermore, the ability to execute code in the context of SYSTEM aligns with Local Privilege Escalation tactics, where an attacker leverages misconfigurations or software vulnerabilities to gain higher-level permissions than originally granted. The specific mechanism of manipulating file paths corresponds to techniques involving File and Directory Discovery followed by Command Line Interface execution if malicious files are placed for subsequent triggering. Understanding these mappings helps in deploying appropriate detection rules within security information and event management systems to monitor for anomalous path traversal attempts or unexpected privilege changes associated with the Foglight service account.
Mitigation strategies should focus on both immediate remediation and long-term architectural improvements. The primary corrective action is to apply vendor-provided patches that address the input validation logic in the loadEvolveLicense script, ensuring that all user-supplied paths are strictly validated against a whitelist of allowed directories or sanitized using canonicalization techniques before file operations occur. In addition to patching, organizations should enforce strict least-privilege principles by configuring the Foglight for Databases service account to run with minimal necessary permissions rather than full SYSTEM rights wherever possible. Network segmentation can also limit exposure by restricting access to the management interface only from trusted administrative subnets. Regular vulnerability scanning and penetration testing focused on authentication-based web application flaws will help identify similar weaknesses in other components of the suite before they can be exploited in a production environment.