CVE-2026-9220 in Setracker2 Parental Control App package com.tgelec.setracker
Summary
by MITRE • 06/26/2026
Setracker2 Android Companion App com.tgelec.setracker versions 3.1.5 and prior encrypts requests between the watch and its backend with static hardcoded AES keys and initialization vectors. This allows an attacker to decrypt Setracker2 watch traffic.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 06/26/2026
The Setracker2 Android companion application presents a critical cryptographic vulnerability that undermines the security of device communications through the use of static hardcoded encryption keys. This flaw affects all versions up to and including 3.1.5, creating a persistent weakness in the system architecture that directly violates fundamental security principles for data protection. The implementation employs AES encryption with predetermined keys and initialization vectors that remain unchanged across all device interactions, fundamentally compromising the confidentiality of sensitive information transmitted between the wearable device and its backend services.
This vulnerability represents a severe deviation from established cryptographic best practices and aligns with CWE-327, which addresses the use of broken or weak cryptographic algorithms. The hardcoded nature of these encryption parameters creates a situation where any attacker who can intercept network traffic gains complete access to the decryption keys through reverse engineering or static analysis of the application binary. The attack surface is further expanded by the fact that these keys are not dynamically generated or derived from secure key exchange mechanisms, making them readily available to threat actors without sophisticated cryptanalysis techniques.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple data interception, as it enables comprehensive traffic analysis and potential manipulation of communication between the watch device and its backend services. Attackers can decrypt sensitive information including location data, user preferences, and potentially personal identifiers transmitted through the application. This weakness directly maps to ATT&CK technique T1041 by enabling network sniffing and data interception capabilities that would otherwise be protected by proper encryption mechanisms. The vulnerability essentially removes the cryptographic protection layer that should safeguard communications from eavesdropping attacks.
The security implications of this flaw are particularly concerning given the nature of wearable devices and their typical use cases involving personal monitoring and location tracking. Users of Setracker2 applications may face privacy violations, location tracking exposure, and potential identity theft through the unencrypted transmission of sensitive data. The static key approach creates a scenario where a single compromise of the application binary results in complete decryption capability for all historical and future communications, making this vulnerability particularly dangerous from a long-term security perspective.
Organizations should implement immediate mitigations including updating to versions that address this hardcoded key issue, implementing dynamic key generation mechanisms, and establishing proper key management protocols. The solution must involve transitioning from static to dynamic encryption parameters, utilizing secure key derivation functions, and implementing proper key rotation mechanisms. Additionally, network traffic monitoring should be enhanced to detect anomalous patterns that might indicate exploitation attempts. This vulnerability highlights the importance of cryptographic hygiene in mobile applications and demonstrates how seemingly minor implementation flaws can create significant security risks for users relying on connected wearable devices for personal monitoring and location services.