CVE-2026-92893 in Satellite
Summary
by MITRE • 09/17/2026
A flaw was found in the foreman_ansible plugin's Ansible inventory API. The controller builds its host query using an unscoped Host.where call that does not enforce the search filter associated with the caller's view_hosts permission. An authenticated user whose host visibility is restricted by a permission filter can supply arbitrary host IDs within their organization and receive the full Ansible inventory for those hosts, including parameter values marked as hidden.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 09/17/2026
The vulnerability identified in the foreman_ansible plugin represents a critical authorization bypass within the Ansible inventory API interface of Foreman. This flaw stems from an improper implementation of access control mechanisms where the backend logic fails to enforce role-based permissions during data retrieval operations. Specifically, when constructing queries for host information, the system utilizes an unscoped Host.where call that operates independently of the caller's contextual security filters. In a properly secured environment, API endpoints must validate user privileges against defined permission scopes before returning sensitive infrastructure details. However, in this instance, the query construction process ignores the search filter associated with the view_hosts permission, effectively decoupling data access from identity verification and role restrictions.
From a technical perspective, the core issue lies in the lack of parameterized scoping for database queries involving host entities. When an authenticated user requests inventory data, the application should restrict results to only those hosts explicitly permitted by their assigned roles or groups. Instead, the unscoped query allows any valid authentication token to retrieve information based solely on provided identifiers within the organization's scope. This architectural oversight means that even users with limited visibility rights can bypass these restrictions by supplying arbitrary host IDs belonging to other teams or restricted segments of the infrastructure. The system treats all hosts within the same organizational boundary as equally accessible, disregarding granular permission sets designed to isolate sensitive systems from unauthorized personnel.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is significant for organizations relying on Foreman for IT automation and configuration management. An attacker with low-privileged access can exploit this flaw to enumerate host identifiers across their organization without triggering typical security alerts associated with privilege escalation attempts. More critically, the retrieved Ansible inventory includes parameter values that are explicitly marked as hidden or sensitive in the user interface. These parameters often contain credentials, API keys, private IP addresses, and other configuration secrets necessary for automated deployments but intended to be protected from general staff access. The exposure of such data compromises confidentiality integrity across the entire infrastructure, potentially enabling further attacks such as lateral movement, credential stuffing, or targeted exploitation of services running on those hosts.
This vulnerability aligns with CWE-285 Improper Authorization and CWE-601 URL Redirection to Untrusted Site (if applicable via indirect reference) but primarily falls under CWE-862 Missing Authorization in the context of API endpoints. In terms of MITRE ATT&CK, this behavior corresponds to T1078 Valid Accounts for initial access persistence and potentially T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie if session hijacking is involved, though it most directly maps to data exfiltration techniques where sensitive information is gathered from internal systems without proper permission checks. The flaw allows an adversary to gather intelligence about the network topology and security configurations, facilitating subsequent stages of a cyber kill chain such as discovery and credential access.
Mitigation strategies must focus on enforcing strict authorization checks at the application logic layer rather than relying solely on database-level constraints or frontend UI restrictions. Developers should modify the host query construction process to explicitly apply scope filters derived from the current user's permissions before executing any data retrieval operations. Implementing middleware that validates view_hosts privileges against each requested resource ID is essential. Additionally, adopting a principle of least privilege ensures that API responses are filtered based on dynamic role assignments rather than static organizational boundaries. Regular security audits and code reviews focusing on authorization logic in RESTful APIs can prevent similar oversights. Organizations should also consider implementing rate limiting and anomaly detection to monitor for unusual patterns of host enumeration attempts by single users, providing an additional layer of defense against exploitation of this vulnerability.