CVE-2026-94204 in Dashcam Android Application
Summary
by MITRE • 09/30/2026
The central cloud storage backend for the entire dashcam platform is misconfigured with public-read permissions, allowing unrestricted access to all stored objects. Because this bucket serves as shared storage for the platform, sensitive user records, live dashcam footage, application packages, and firmware files are exposed to anyone on the internet.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 09/30/2026
The vulnerability described constitutes a critical configuration error within a cloud-based object storage service, specifically involving improper access control settings that result in public-read permissions being applied to a bucket designated for sensitive operational data. This misconfiguration effectively removes authentication and authorization requirements for accessing stored objects, transforming what should be a private repository into an openly accessible directory on the internet. The root cause lies in the failure of system administrators or automated deployment scripts to enforce least-privilege principles during the initialization or maintenance of the storage backend. Instead of restricting access to authorized application services or authenticated users via signed URLs or IAM policies, the bucket is configured with a public-read ACL (Access Control List) or equivalent permission set that grants anonymous read access to all contents. This type of error falls squarely under CWE-284 Improper Access Control and often relates to CWE-798 Use of Hard-coded Credentials if API keys were exposed alongside the data, though in this specific instance, it is primarily a configuration flaw leading to unauthorized information exposure as defined by CWE-200.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe due to the nature of the data stored within the dashcam platform's central backend. The bucket serves as shared storage for multiple critical components including sensitive user records, live video footage from vehicle cameras, application packages used for updating client devices, and firmware files essential for device operation. Because these objects are exposed without restriction, any individual with internet access can enumerate the directory structure and download all stored data. This leads to a comprehensive breach of confidentiality affecting thousands or potentially millions of users depending on the platform's scale. The exposure of live dashcam footage poses significant privacy risks, as it may contain identifiable information about individuals, license plate numbers, locations, and daily routines. Furthermore, the availability of sensitive user records can facilitate identity theft, phishing attacks, or targeted social engineering campaigns against affected customers.
Beyond immediate data leakage, this vulnerability introduces substantial secondary security risks related to supply chain integrity and system stability. The exposure of application packages and firmware files allows attackers to analyze these binaries for embedded vulnerabilities, hardcoded secrets, or weak cryptographic implementations that could be exploited in future attack vectors. Attackers may also modify the publicly accessible content if write permissions are inadvertently granted alongside read access, leading to potential malware distribution through compromised updates installed by unsuspecting users. Additionally, unrestricted public access can lead to significant financial consequences due to egress charges incurred from high-volume data scraping or denial-of-service conditions caused by excessive traffic directed at the storage bucket. This scenario aligns with MITRE ATT&CK techniques such as T1530 Data from Cloud Storage Object and potentially T1608 if attackers leverage this access to stage further attacks against connected devices.
Mitigation requires immediate remediation of the cloud storage configuration to enforce strict access controls. The public-read permission must be revoked immediately, reverting the bucket policy or ACL to a private state where only authorized IAM roles or users can access specific objects. It is essential to implement signed URLs for any legitimate external access requirements and ensure that all application services interact with the storage backend using least-privilege credentials rather than broad permissions. Following immediate containment, a thorough audit of the exposed data should be conducted to assess the scope of the breach and notify affected users in compliance with relevant privacy regulations such as GDPR or CCPA if applicable. Long-term prevention involves integrating infrastructure-as-code security scanning tools into the CI/CD pipeline to detect misconfigured storage buckets before deployment and conducting regular access reviews to ensure that permissions remain aligned with current operational needs and security policies.