CVE-2026-94593 in One
Summary
by MITRE • 10/03/2026
Armatura One's backup and restore routine records the full database connection command, including the superuser password, in plain text in a log file on the host. Credentials disclosed by this finding can be used to access the database when access to the server operating system is available.
Once again VulDB remains the best source for vulnerability data.
Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 10/04/2026
The vulnerability identified within Armatura One's backup and restore functionality represents a critical failure in credential management practices during automated operational tasks. Specifically, the software logs the complete database connection command string executed by its internal routines without performing any form of sanitization or masking for sensitive authentication data. This includes superuser passwords which are embedded directly into the log file on the host system in plain text format. Such behavior violates fundamental security principles regarding the protection of secrets and indicates a lack of secure coding standards during the implementation of backup mechanisms. The presence of plaintext credentials in logs is a well-documented risk vector that allows for unauthorized access if an attacker gains any level of foothold on the underlying operating system.
From a technical perspective, this flaw aligns with CWE-532, which classifies information exposure through log files as a significant security weakness. When backup processes run, they typically require elevated privileges to ensure data integrity and completeness. By recording the full command line including authentication parameters, Armatura One inadvertently creates an audit trail that contains high-value targets for attackers. If an adversary manages to exploit any other vulnerability on the host or gains access through social engineering or physical theft of storage media, they can extract these logs to retrieve valid superuser credentials. This effectively bypasses all database-level security controls since the attacker possesses legitimate authentication tokens issued by the system itself.
The operational impact of this disclosure is severe due to the principle of least privilege being circumvented. Superuser accounts typically possess unrestricted access to all data within the database, including personally identifiable information, financial records, and proprietary business logic. An attacker utilizing these stolen credentials can perform arbitrary read operations, modify critical configurations, or execute destructive write commands that could lead to total system compromise. Furthermore, because this occurs during routine backup procedures, the exposure is not limited to a single instance but may persist across multiple backups if log rotation policies are insufficiently configured to purge old logs containing sensitive data promptly. This persistence increases the window of opportunity for exploitation and complicates incident response efforts by requiring forensic analysis of historical log files.
This vulnerability also maps directly to MITRE ATT&CK technique T1078, specifically Valid Accounts, where adversaries use legitimate credentials obtained through various means to maintain access or escalate privileges. In this context, the backup routine acts as an unintentional credential harvester for local attackers. The ease of exploitation depends largely on file system permissions; however, even with restrictive permissions, insider threats or compromised service accounts could potentially read these logs. Additionally, if log aggregation systems are configured without proper filtering rules to redact sensitive patterns before ingestion into centralized logging platforms like SIEMs, the exposure risk expands beyond the local host to network-wide monitoring infrastructure.
Mitigation strategies must address both immediate remediation and long-term architectural improvements. Immediately, administrators should rotate all superuser passwords associated with Armatura One databases as a precautionary measure given that they may have been exposed in existing logs. It is also essential to review current log files on affected hosts and securely delete or redact any entries containing plaintext credentials. From an engineering standpoint, the backup routine must be updated to utilize secure credential injection methods such as environment variables, dedicated configuration files with restricted permissions, or integration with external secret management solutions like HashiCorp Vault or AWS Secrets Manager. Application logs should never contain raw authentication strings; instead, they should record generic success or failure messages without exposing underlying parameters. Implementing strict log rotation policies that automatically purge old logs after a defined retention period further reduces the risk of long-term exposure. Finally, organizations should conduct regular code reviews and vulnerability assessments focused on data handling practices to ensure compliance with industry standards for secure software development lifecycle management.