CVE-2026-97892 in LibreOffice
Summary
by MITRE • 11/16/2026
LibreOffice checks the digital signatures of a PDF document when the document is opened, and shows whether each signature is valid. An out-of-bounds write existed when a signature was checked, because the parts of the file that a crafted signature claims to cover were not checked against the size of the file. In fixed versions a signature that claims to cover anything outside the file is reported as not valid.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 11/16/2026
The vulnerability identified in LibreOffice represents a critical failure in input validation during the processing of digitally signed PDF documents, specifically within the component responsible for verifying cryptographic signatures. When a user opens a PDF document containing embedded digital signatures, LibreOffice performs a verification process to determine if each signature is valid and authenticates the integrity of the associated data. This security mechanism relies on comparing the byte ranges claimed by the signature against the actual size of the file to ensure that the signed content matches what was originally hashed during signing. The flaw arises because the application fails to validate whether the range specified in a crafted or maliciously constructed signature extends beyond the physical boundaries of the PDF file itself. This lack of bounds checking allows an attacker to craft a document where the signature metadata asserts coverage over memory regions that do not exist within the file structure, leading directly to an out-of-bounds write condition during the verification routine.
From a technical perspective, this defect is classified as CWE-787: Out-of-Bounds Write, which occurs when software writes data past the end or before the beginning of the intended buffer. In the context of LibreOffice, the parsing logic for PDF signature blocks does not adequately sanitize the offset and length values provided in the cryptographic headers. When these unchecked values are used to calculate memory addresses for writing verification status or related metadata, they can point to arbitrary locations in the application's heap or stack space. This type of vulnerability is particularly dangerous because it bypasses standard boundary checks that are typically enforced by modern operating system protections such as Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) and Data Execution Prevention (DEP), provided the attacker has sufficient control over the data written. The absence of a strict size comparison between the claimed signature coverage and the actual file length creates an exploitable gap in the application's security posture, allowing for potential memory corruption that can lead to arbitrary code execution or denial of service conditions depending on how the overwritten memory is utilized by subsequent operations within the LibreOffice process.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple data integrity concerns, as it poses a significant risk to end-users who rely on digital signatures to verify document authenticity and non-repudiation. An attacker can distribute malicious PDF documents via email or file-sharing platforms that exploit this flaw upon opening. If successfully exploited, the out-of-bounds write could allow for remote code execution with the privileges of the user running LibreOffice, potentially leading to full system compromise. Furthermore, even if immediate exploitation is not feasible due to mitigating factors in specific environments, the vulnerability undermines trust in the digital signature verification process itself. Users may be misled into believing a document is authentic when it has been tampered with or crafted specifically to trigger this memory corruption bug. This erosion of confidence in cryptographic validation mechanisms can have severe consequences for organizations that depend on LibreOffice for processing legally binding documents where proof of integrity and origin is required.
To mitigate the risks associated with this vulnerability, users must ensure they are running a version of LibreOffice that includes the fix which explicitly validates signature ranges against file size before performing any write operations related to signature verification. The corrected behavior ensures that any signature claiming coverage outside the bounds of the document is immediately flagged as invalid rather than processed further. In addition to applying software updates, organizations should implement strict email filtering and web gateway solutions to block suspicious PDF attachments from reaching end-users. Security awareness training should also be conducted to educate staff on the risks of opening documents with digital signatures from untrusted sources. For developers maintaining LibreOffice or similar office suites, it is imperative to enforce rigorous input validation for all cryptographic parameters, ensuring that offsets and lengths are always checked against buffer limits before memory allocation or modification occurs. This aligns with best practices outlined in OWASP guidelines for secure coding and helps prevent similar out-of-bounds write vulnerabilities across the software supply chain.