CVE-2026-99324 in Linux
Summary
by MITRE • 11/19/2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: fix out-of-bounds read when padding the final compound response
Compound response handling pads the last response of a compound to an 8-byte boundary by growing the final iov and the RFC1002 length. smb2_allocate_rsp_buf() allocates exactly response_sz. A command can fill the response buffer to within 7 bytes of its end, for example a QUERY_INFO whose output is bounded only by the space left. The padding can then run past the allocation, and ksmbd_tcp_writev() reads those bytes when it sends the response.
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _copy_from_iter+0x744/0x10e0 Call Trace: _copy_from_iter+0x744/0x10e0 tcp_sendmsg_locked+0x2290/0x3f80 ksmbd_tcp_writev+0x10c7/0x1ab0 [ksmbd]
Allocate room for the padding when the request is a compound, as smb2_read() and smb2_read_pipe() do for their payloads. response_sz is unchanged, so commands still fill only up to it, and kvzalloc() zeroes the padding.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 11/19/2026
The ksmbd kernel module implements support for SMB3 protocol operations within the Linux operating system, facilitating file sharing between Windows clients and Linux servers. A critical vulnerability was identified in the handling of compound responses, specifically regarding the memory allocation strategy used when preparing network packets for transmission. Compound requests allow a client to bundle multiple SMB commands into a single network packet, which the server processes sequentially and responds to with a series of response segments. The protocol specification requires that each segment be padded to an eight-byte boundary to ensure proper alignment during processing. In the affected implementation, while intermediate responses were correctly handled, the final compound response suffered from a logic error in buffer sizing.
The technical flaw stems from how smb2_allocate_rsp_buf() calculates and allocates memory for the response payload. The function allocates exactly the size required by the command output without accounting for the mandatory padding bytes needed to align the end of the packet. When an SMB command, such as QUERY_INFO, generates a response that fills the buffer to within seven bytes of its limit, the subsequent padding operation attempts to write beyond the allocated memory boundary. This results in a slab-out-of-bounds read condition because ksmbd_tcp_writev() proceeds to transmit the entire logical packet length, including the unallocated padded region, effectively reading kernel stack or heap data that lies immediately after the intended buffer allocation.
This vulnerability is classified under CWE-125, which describes out-of-bounds read vulnerabilities where software reads memory beyond the end of a buffer. From an offensive security perspective, this aligns with ATT&CK technique T1083, File and Directory Discovery, as it involves accessing system resources in an unauthorized manner through protocol manipulation. The operational impact is significant because an unauthenticated or authenticated remote attacker can trigger this condition by sending crafted compound SMB requests. By exploiting the out-of-bounds read, an attacker may be able to leak sensitive kernel memory contents, potentially revealing cryptographic keys, internal pointers, or other confidential data stored in adjacent memory regions. This information disclosure could facilitate further attacks against the host system or the network infrastructure it supports.
The resolution involves modifying the buffer allocation logic for compound responses to explicitly reserve space for the required padding bytes before transmission. By ensuring that response_sz includes room for alignment when handling compound requests, similar to how smb2_read() and smb2_read_pipe() handle their payloads, the kernel prevents access to unallocated memory regions. Additionally, since kvzalloc is used for allocation, any extra bytes reserved for padding are zeroed out by default, further mitigating the risk of leaking uninitialized data if the logic were ever altered in future updates. System administrators should apply the latest available patches or kernel updates that include this fix to ensure the integrity and confidentiality of their SMB services. Regular vulnerability scanning and monitoring for anomalous network traffic patterns related to SMB protocol interactions are recommended as supplementary defensive measures.