CVE-2026-99381 in Linuxinfo

Summary

by MITRE • 11/19/2026

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

smb: client: reject short or out-of-range FIND response parameters

CIFSFindFirst() and CIFSFindNext() read the SearchHandle, SearchCount, EndofSearch and LastNameOffset of a TRANS2_FIND_FIRST2 or TRANS2_FIND_NEXT2 response at ParameterOffset. validate_t2() bounds the offset at 1024 and ParameterCount below 512, and nothing compares them with the number of bytes SendReceive() copied into the buffer or with the size of the response parameters. smb_init() places the request and the response in the same cifs_request allocation and cifs_buf_get() clears only the start of it, so a short response with a ParameterOffset past its end has the search handle, the entry count, the end-of-search flag and the last-entry offset read out of the request that was just sent, or out of whatever the allocation held before, and a ParameterCount smaller than the parameters has them read past the end of the parameter block. The reads stay inside the allocation, but what they return is not part of the response, and CIFSFindFirst() then hands back a search handle the server never sent. That handle is sent back to the server in the next FIND_NEXT2 or FIND_CLOSE2, so two bytes of the buffer leak at an offset the server picks.

SMB1 is not negotiated by default; reaching this code requires an explicit vers=1.0 mount.

Reject a response whose parameter area is smaller than the response parameters or extends past the received length, returning smb_EIO2() with a new smb_eio_traces value for each of the two responses, like the other response checks this file gained since v6.19. Backports to trees before v6.19 need smb_EIO2() replaced with -EINVAL and the trace.h hunk dropped.

A conforming server is not affected. The parameter block of a transaction response is part of the SMB, so ParameterOffset + ParameterCount cannot exceed the smbCalcSize() bytes that SendReceive() copies, and the response parameters are 10 bytes for FIND_FIRST2 and 8 bytes for FIND_NEXT2, which is what T2_FFIRST_RSP_PARMS and T2_FNEXT_RSP_PARMS hold.

This patch depends on "smb: client: reject FIND data areas that run past the received response", whose declarations it extends.

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Analysis

by VulDB Data Team • 11/20/2026

The Linux kernel CIFS SMB1 client implementation contained a critical input validation flaw within the TRANS2_FIND_FIRST2 and TRANS2_FIND_NEXT2 transaction handlers, specifically in the functions CIFSFindFirst() and CIFSFindNext(). This vulnerability arises from an insufficient check of response parameter boundaries relative to the actual data received over the network. When processing these SMB1 transactions, the kernel reads specific fields such as SearchHandle, SearchCount, EndofSearch, and LastNameOffset at a location determined by ParameterOffset within the response buffer. While existing validation logic in validate_t2() ensures that ParameterOffset does not exceed 1024 bytes and that ParameterCount is greater than or equal to 512, it fails to verify whether these values are consistent with the total size of the received SMB transaction data copied by SendReceive(). This gap allows a malicious server to craft a response where the declared parameter area extends beyond the actual length of the packet or contains fewer bytes than required for valid parsing.

The operational impact of this flaw is twofold, involving both information disclosure and potential state corruption through protocol manipulation. Due to how smb_init() allocates memory, the request buffer and response buffer share the same allocation structure, with only the beginning cleared upon receipt. If a server sends a short or malformed response where ParameterOffset points beyond the end of the received data, the kernel reads uninitialized or stale memory contents from the preceding request packet or previous allocations to populate the search handle and other fields. Consequently, CIFSFindFirst() returns an invalid search handle that was never generated by the legitimate server. When this corrupted state is utilized in subsequent transactions like FIND_NEXT2 or FIND_CLOSE2, the client transmits these fabricated handles back to the attacker-controlled server. This results in a two-byte information leak at offsets selected by the remote adversary, effectively allowing them to read arbitrary data from the kernel's memory space via the SMB1 protocol channel.

From a technical classification perspective, this vulnerability aligns with CWE-20 Improper Input Validation and CWE-200 Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor. The failure to validate that ParameterOffset plus ParameterCount does not exceed the total response size constitutes a classic boundary check bypass. In terms of attack vectors, this flaw is exploitable in scenarios where SMB1 negotiation has been explicitly enabled, as modern Linux distributions do not negotiate SMB1 by default due to its numerous security weaknesses. An attacker must have network access to an SMB server that supports version 1.0 and can be coerced into sending malformed responses during file search operations. The exploitation relies on the client trusting unverified metadata within the protocol header without cross-referencing it against the actual payload length, a pattern often seen in legacy protocol implementations where performance optimizations bypassed rigorous bounds checking.

Mitigation strategies primarily involve ensuring that SMB1 is not negotiated unless absolutely necessary for compatibility with extremely old systems. Administrators should explicitly disable SMB1 support on both client and server sides by setting vers=2.0 or higher during mount operations, thereby preventing the code path containing this vulnerability from being executed. For environments where legacy access is unavoidable, applying kernel patches that enforce strict validation of response parameter lengths is essential. The fix involves rejecting any response whose parameter area extends past the received length or has a size smaller than required by the protocol specification for FIND_FIRST2 and FIND_NEXT2 transactions. These corrections return an I/O error to prevent further processing with corrupted state variables, effectively neutralizing the information leak vector. Developers maintaining older kernel versions must ensure that equivalent validation logic is backported, replacing modern trace mechanisms with standard error codes like -EINVAL where necessary to maintain compatibility with pre-v6.19 tree structures while closing this security gap.

Responsible

Linux

Reservation

09/25/2026

Disclosure

11/19/2026

Moderation

accepted

CPE

ready

EPSS

0.00213

KEV

no

Activities

very low

Sources

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