CVE-2026-99429 in Linux
Summary
by MITRE • 11/19/2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ocfs2: pin refcount trees before dropping the lookup lock
A refcount tree returned to ocfs2_lock_refcount_tree() must stay alive until that caller releases its operation reference. However, ocfs2_get_refcount_tree() returns the cached pointer after dropping osb_lock, and the caller only takes its kref afterwards. The registry reference does not protect this gap from concurrent removal.
This can happen when another node frees a refcount root and reuses its block with a different generation while this mount retains the old cached tree. Two local operations on different inodes sharing the new root, such as data CoW and an external xattr update, can then look up the same stale tree. Their inode locks are independent, and both the REFCOUNT DLM lock and rf_sem are acquired after the first operation reference.
The following ordering is possible, with no other operation references:
Data CoW Xattr update -------- ------------ Look up the old tree under osb_lock, then drop osb_lock Look up the same tree and take a kref Acquire the tree locks and read the new on-disk generation Erase the old tree under osb_lock Unlock and drop the operation kref Drop the registry kref, freeing tree Take a kref through the freed tree pointer
The final kref_get() accesses freed rf_getcnt storage, and subsequent accesses in ocfs2_lock_refcount_tree() also use the freed allocation.
Take the operation reference in ocfs2_get_refcount_tree() before releasing osb_lock, including when an insertion loses to another lookup. Removal must acquire the same lock, so it cannot drop the registry reference before the lookup has pinned the tree. Keep the existing unlock and error path puts. The two callers that already hold the refcount tree lock keep their borrowed lookup behavior and do not acquire an extra reference.
KASAN report as below:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ocfs2_lock_refcount_tree+0x94a/0x9b0 Read of size 4 at addr ffff888117212820 by task python3/497
[Kernel and hardware identification omitted.]
Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x93/0xd0 print_report+0xce/0x630 ? ocfs2_lock_refcount_tree+0x94a/0x9b0 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? __virt_addr_valid+0x20e/0x420 ? ocfs2_lock_refcount_tree+0x94a/0x9b0 kasan_report+0xe0/0x110 ? ocfs2_lock_refcount_tree+0x94a/0x9b0 ocfs2_lock_refcount_tree+0x94a/0x9b0 ? __pfx_ocfs2_lock_refcount_tree+0x10/0x10 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? ocfs2_refcount_cow+0x3b6/0xd90 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x28d/0x610 ? ocfs2_refcount_cow+0x3b6/0xd90 ocfs2_refcount_cow+0x410/0xd90 ? __pfx_ocfs2_refcount_cow+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx___might_resched+0x10/0x10 ? down_write+0x11a/0x1f0 ? __pfx_down_write+0x10/0x10 ? ocfs2_inode_unlock+0x1a9/0x260 ? __pfx_ocfs2_inode_unlock+0x10/0x10 ? ocfs2_file_write_iter+0x1413/0x1d30 ocfs2_file_write_iter+0x157b/0x1d30 ? __pfx_ocfs2_file_write_iter+0x10/0x10 ? lock_acquire+0x190/0x300 ? __x64_sys_pwrite64+0x1b7/0x220 ? __pfx___might_resched+0x10/0x10 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? security_file_permission+0x26/0x80 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? lock_is_held_type+0x8f/0x100 vfs_write+0x639/0x1010 ? __pfx_ocfs2_file_write_iter+0x10/0x10 ? lock_vma_under_rcu+0x154/0x4a0 ? __pfx_vfs_write+0x10/0x10 ? lock_release+0x121/0x290 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 __x64_sys_pwrite64+0x1b7/0x220 ? __pfx___x64_sys_pwrite64+0x10/0x10 ? irqentry_exit+0xbe/0x820 ---truncated---
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 11/20/2026
The vulnerability identified in the Linux kernel's OCFS2 filesystem driver represents a critical use-after-free condition arising from improper reference counting and lock ordering within the refcount tree management logic. This flaw specifically affects systems utilizing Oracle Cluster File System version 2, particularly when operating with enabled reflink or copy-on-write features that rely on dedicated refcount trees to manage shared data blocks across multiple inodes. The core issue stems from a race condition where a cached pointer to a refcount tree is returned by the ocfs2_get_refcount_tree function after the osb_lock has been released, but before an operation reference key reference count is acquired. This temporal gap allows for scenarios where another node or thread can free the underlying data structure and potentially reuse that memory block with different content while the original caller still holds a stale pointer to it.
From a technical perspective, the flaw manifests when two local operations on distinct inodes share the same refcount root, such as during a copy-on-write operation for one inode and an external extended attribute update for another. These operations operate independently regarding their respective inode locks but converge at the level of the shared refcount tree management. The sequence begins with one operation looking up the old tree under osb_lock before dropping it to avoid holding the lock across potentially long-running I/O operations. Simultaneously, a second lookup may occur for the same stale tree entry. Because the registry reference does not protect this specific gap between releasing the global lock and acquiring the local key reference count, the first operation can proceed to erase its old tree under osb_lock again, eventually dropping both the operation kref and the registry kref. This action triggers the actual deallocation of the memory structure containing rf_getcnt storage.
The exploitation or triggering of this vulnerability leads directly to a kernel panic or system instability due to invalid memory access. As evidenced by Kernel Address Sanitizer reports associated with this issue, the final attempt to take a key reference count through the now-freed tree pointer results in reading from freed slab memory. Subsequent calls within ocfs2_lock_refcount_tree also interact with this corrupted allocation, leading to undefined behavior that can be exploited for denial of service or potentially more severe impacts depending on the specific state of the kernel heap at the time of access. The call trace indicates that this occurs during standard file write iterations involving copy-on-write logic, meaning it is reachable through normal user-space interactions without requiring elevated privileges beyond those needed to perform filesystem operations on affected files.
This vulnerability aligns with CWE-416, Use After Free, as the system attempts to access memory after it has been freed by another part of the kernel subsystem. In terms of attack vector classification under MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise or ICS, this falls under Tactic Execution and Defense Evasion, specifically relating to techniques that involve exploiting race conditions in shared resources. The impact is primarily a Denial of Service against the host system due to kernel oops or panic, but it also poses risks related to data integrity if the freed memory was reused for sensitive structures before being overwritten with garbage values.
The resolution involves correcting the lock ordering and reference counting logic within ocfs2_get_refcount_tree. The fix mandates that the operation reference must be taken prior to releasing osb_lock, ensuring that the refcount tree remains pinned in memory until the caller explicitly releases its operation reference. This change ensures that removal operations cannot drop the registry reference while a lookup is still potentially accessing the structure. By maintaining this strict ordering, the race condition window is eliminated. Systems running affected versions of the Linux kernel must apply the provided patch to restore stability and security for OCFS2 deployments. Administrators should verify their cluster configurations are updated with the latest kernel packages that include this fix, particularly those relying on reflink capabilities where concurrent metadata updates are common.