CVE-2026-99533 in Linuxinfo

Summary

by MITRE • 11/19/2026

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ksmbd: validate AppInstanceId takeover target

AppInstanceId lookup currently selects the first open with the matching identifier. CREATE for an unrelated share or path can therefore force-close another session's open before authorization of the new target. Matching only the base path also conflates alternate data streams with the unnamed stream.

MS-SMB2 requires the old open to match the share and path, belong to a different ClientGuid, and be closed only when the requester has GENERIC_READ access. Search all opens with the ID and match share, resolved path, stream, and the current connection's client GUID. Retain a share configuration reference in ksmbd_file and reuse its name instead of allocating a name for every open. This keeps matching safe during tree connection teardown and preserves name-based matching across configuration updates.

Refresh the share reference on durable reconnect and restore the old reference if reopening fails. Serialize connection and share comparisons with durable disconnect/reconnect, and recheck the target before closing it. Keep the original ClientGuid for durable replay and lease checks.

Check AppInstanceVersion before querying access, even when GENERIC_READ is absent, and before disconnected delete-on-close cleanup. Rejected CREATE must leave other durable opens untouched. Calculate maximal access on the matched open's referenced path so a rename cannot substitute another file's authorization. Require read access with the effective VFS credentials as well as the NT DACL before takeover. Access denial only skips takeover and leaves CREATE to its normal access checks. Restore filesystem credentials before returning a takeover error.

Handle takeover before checking FILE_CREATE collisions, and re-resolve the path after closing the old open. This lets delete-on-close remove the old file before a new one is created. Include SYNCHRONIZE in the baseline maximal-access mask so read-only files report GENERIC_READ correctly.

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Analysis

by VulDB Data Team • 11/19/2026

The vulnerability identified within the Linux kernel's ksmbd implementation centers on an insufficient validation of AppInstanceId takeover targets during SMB2 CREATE operations. This flaw allows a malicious client to force-close another session’s open file handle before proper authorization checks are completed for the new target. The root cause lies in the lookup mechanism, which previously selected only the first open with a matching identifier without verifying that the old and new opens belong to different clients or share contexts. Furthermore, by matching solely on the base path, the implementation incorrectly conflated alternate data streams with unnamed streams, leading to potential unauthorized access control bypasses where one session could inadvertently or maliciously terminate another’s file handle under false pretenses of identity matching.

From a technical perspective, this issue represents a significant deviation from the MS-SMB2 protocol specification regarding durable handles and AppInstanceId management. The correct behavior requires that an old open be matched not just by identifier but also by share context, resolved path, stream type, and crucially, must belong to a different ClientGuid than the requester. Additionally, the closure of the previous handle should only occur after verifying that the current connection possesses GENERIC_READ access rights. By failing to enforce these constraints, ksmbd allowed race conditions and logic errors where unauthorized sessions could disrupt existing connections or gain unintended access privileges by exploiting the premature closing of file handles associated with alternate data streams or unrelated paths within the same directory structure.

The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe, as it compromises both confidentiality and integrity of SMB shares. An attacker could potentially deny service to legitimate users by forcing the closure of their active file sessions, leading to application crashes or data loss if unsaved work was associated with those handles. More critically, the conflation of alternate streams and base paths means that an attacker might bypass access control lists (ACLs) intended for specific named streams by targeting the unnamed stream or vice versa. This undermines the security model of SMB2, which relies on strict isolation between different client sessions and precise attribute matching to ensure that only authorized entities can manipulate file states across durable reconnect scenarios.

To mitigate this vulnerability, the ksmbd implementation has been updated to perform comprehensive validation before any AppInstanceId takeover occurs. The system now searches all open handles for a given ID and strictly matches them against the share context, resolved path, stream identifier, and the current connection’s ClientGuid. A critical architectural change involves retaining a reference to the share configuration within ksmbd_file structures rather than allocating names dynamically for every open; this ensures that name-based matching remains safe even during tree connection teardowns or when share configurations are updated. Additionally, access checks now verify AppInstanceVersion and require GENERIC_READ access based on effective VFS credentials as well as NT DACL permissions before allowing a takeover to proceed.

Further hardening measures include serializing connection and share comparisons with durable disconnect and reconnect events to prevent race conditions during state transitions. The system now refreshes the share reference upon durable reconnection and restores old references if reopening fails, ensuring consistency in handle management. By handling AppInstanceId takeovers before checking for FILE_CREATE collisions and re-resolving paths after closing old opens, the implementation correctly supports delete-on-close semantics without interfering with new file creation logic. Finally, including SYNCHRONIZE in the baseline maximal-access mask ensures that read-only files are reported accurately as having GENERIC_READ rights, preventing misinterpretations of access levels during takeover operations. These changes align ksmbd more closely with industry standards such as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) and MITRE ATT&CK techniques related to privilege escalation and session hijacking via SMB protocol exploitation.

Responsible

Linux

Reservation

09/25/2026

Disclosure

11/19/2026

Moderation

accepted

CPE

ready

EPSS

0.00156

KEV

no

Activities

very low

Sources

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