CVE-2026-99772 in Linux
Summary
by MITRE • 11/20/2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/drm_crtc: fix race with dma_fence_signal() in ::get_driver_name()
Since commit 541c8f2468b9 ("dma-buf: detach fence ops on signal v3"), I'm seeing the BUG_ON() triggering in drm_crtc's fence_to_crtc() via drm_crtc_fence_get_driver_name() regularly:
Call trace: panic+0x58/0x5c die+0x160/0x178 bug_brk_handler+0x70/0xa4 call_el1_break_hook+0x3c/0x1a0 do_el1_brk64+0x24/0x74 el1_brk64+0x34/0x54 el1h_64_sync_handler+0x80/0xfc el1h_64_sync+0x84/0x88 drm_crtc_fence_get_driver_name+0x60/0x68 (P) sync_file_get_name+0x184/0x45c sync_file_ioctl+0x404/0xf70 __arm64_sys_ioctl+0x124/0x1dc
This looks to be caused by a code flow similar to the following:
+++ snip +++ thread A thread B
ioctl(SYNC_IOC_FILE_INFO) sync_file_ioctl() sync_file_get_name() dma_fence_signal_timestamp_locked() dma_fence_driver_name() ops = rcu_dereference(fence->ops) if (!dma_fence_test_signaled_flag()) ops->get_driver_name(fence) i.e. drm_crtc_fence_get_driver_name() test_and_set_bit(SIGNALED) RCU_INIT_POINTER(fence->ops, NULL) drm_crtc_fence_get_driver_name() BUG_ON(rcu_access_pointer(fence->ops) != &drm_crtc_fence_ops) +++ snap +++
In other words, a fence's ops pointer can now change to NULL on signal, which wasn't the case before the culprit commit and hence the BUG_ON() triggers.
Simply drop the BUG_ON() as it's usage of fence ops is invalid now, and because using BUG_ON() and friends to take down the system is an unacceptable way to handle a failure.
Note that the adjacent drm_crtc_fence_get_timeline_name() has the same problem and is fixed by this patch as well.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 11/20/2026
The Linux kernel contains a race condition vulnerability within the DRM CRTC subsystem, specifically affecting the fence management logic introduced in commit 541c8f2468b9 regarding dma-buf fence operations. This flaw manifests when accessing driver names for synchronization fences through the ioctl interface, leading to system crashes via triggered BUG_ON assertions. The root cause lies in a timing window where one thread signals a DMA fence while another thread attempts to retrieve its associated driver name concurrently. Prior to the referenced commit, the fence operation structure remained stable during signaling; however, the update changed this behavior by detaching fence operations upon signal completion, setting the ops pointer to NULL via RCU mechanisms. This change introduced a race condition where concurrent access can result in dereferencing or validating against an invalid state.
The technical flaw occurs when thread A executes sync_file_ioctl which calls sync_file_get_name and subsequently dma_fence_signal_timestamp_locked followed by dma_fence_driver_name. Inside this flow, the code performs an RCU read-side critical section to retrieve the fence operations pointer using rcu_dereference. If the signaled flag is not yet set according to a specific check, it proceeds to call ops->get_driver_name on the retrieved structure. Simultaneously or interleaved with this operation, thread B may execute drm_crtc_fence_get_driver_name which relies on an assertion that validates whether the current fence operations pointer matches the expected DRM CRTC fence operations structure using rcu_access_pointer. Because the signaling process in thread A can nullify the ops pointer before thread B completes its validation check, the assertion fails and triggers a kernel panic. This race condition is exacerbated by the non-atomic nature of checking the signaled state versus accessing the operation structures without proper synchronization barriers that account for the new detachment behavior.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe, resulting in immediate system instability or complete denial of service through kernel panics. Users interacting with sync file ioctls, particularly those performing frequent status checks on DMA fences while they are being signaled by other processes or hardware contexts, will encounter these crashes. The use of BUG_ON to handle what is essentially a race condition rather than an unrecoverable internal logic error represents a design flaw in the kernel's error handling strategy for this subsystem. By taking down the entire system instead of gracefully returning an error code such as EAGAIN or NULL, the vulnerability amplifies the impact from a localized functional failure to a catastrophic availability breach affecting all users and services on the affected host.
Mitigation strategies involve applying the upstream Linux kernel patch that removes the invalid BUG_ON assertions within drm_crtc_fence_get_driver_name and the adjacent drm_crtc_fence_get_timeline_name functions. These checks were based on assumptions about fence operation stability that no longer hold true after the dma-buf changes. Replacing these fatal assertions with proper null-checks or returning appropriate error codes allows the system to handle concurrent signaling events gracefully without crashing. Administrators should ensure their systems are updated with kernel versions containing this fix, as it addresses both the driver name and timeline name retrieval paths that share the same underlying race condition logic. This update aligns the DRM subsystem's fence handling with modern dma-buf semantics where operations can be detached upon signal completion.
From a vulnerability classification perspective, this issue corresponds to CWE-362 Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization, commonly known as a race condition. The specific mechanism involves accessing shared data structures without adequate locking or RCU synchronization guarantees during state transitions. In terms of the MITRE ATT&CK framework for Linux systems, this vulnerability relates to techniques involving resource manipulation and potential denial of service through kernel exploitation. While not directly exploitable by an unprivileged user for arbitrary code execution in its current form due to the nature of BUG_ON triggers, it serves as a significant availability risk that could be leveraged in conjunction with other vulnerabilities or used intentionally to disrupt system uptime. The fix emphasizes the importance of validating pointer states against dynamic changes rather than relying on static assumptions about object lifecycles during asynchronous operations.