CVE-2026-99785 in Linux
Summary
by MITRE • 11/20/2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
9p/trans_virtio: reject mount tags longer than NAME_MAX at probe
p9_virtio_probe() reads a 16-bit mount tag length (tag_len) from the device config and kzalloc()s tag_len + 1 bytes for chan->tag with no upper bound. A malicious or compromised host can present a tag of up to 65535 bytes; that tag is later copied into the single-page sysfs buffer by p9_mount_tag_show() (memcpy(buf, chan->tag, tag_len + 1)), a host-controlled out-of-bounds write of up to ~64 KiB past the PAGE_SIZE attribute buffer.
Reject an overlong tag at probe time. A 9p mount tag is a name-like identifier, so bound it by NAME_MAX (255): that limit is independent of the sysfs/seq_file page size and is far above any legitimate mount tag, which keeps p9_mount_tag_show() safe at the root without hard-coding a seq_file implementation detail.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 11/22/2026
The Linux kernel vulnerability identified in the 9p/trans_virtio subsystem represents a critical out-of-bounds write flaw rooted in insufficient input validation during device initialization. The function p9_virtio_probe is responsible for reading configuration data from the virtio device, specifically extracting a mount tag length field which is stored as a sixteen-bit unsigned integer. This design choice allows the host to specify a length value ranging up to 65535 bytes without any upper bound checks relative to available memory or buffer constraints. Consequently, when the kernel allocates memory for the channel structure using kzalloc with a size of tag_len plus one byte, it proceeds based on this untrusted input. While the allocation itself may succeed if sufficient contiguous memory is available, the subsequent operations expose severe integrity risks because the allocated buffer is later accessed by p9_mount_tag_show when exposing mount information through sysfs.
The operational impact becomes critical during the execution of p9_mount_tag_show, which utilizes memcpy to copy the tag data into a single-page system file attribute buffer. This destination buffer has a fixed size corresponding to PAGE_SIZE, typically 4096 bytes on most architectures. Because there is no validation ensuring that tag_len does not exceed this limit or any other reasonable boundary, a malicious or compromised host can trigger an out-of-bounds write of up to approximately sixty-four kilobytes past the end of the intended buffer. This memory corruption allows for potential overwriting of adjacent kernel data structures, leading to system instability, privilege escalation, or remote code execution depending on the specific layout of memory and the attacker's ability to control subsequent allocations. Such vulnerabilities are classified under CWE-787 Out-of-bounds Write within standard vulnerability taxonomy frameworks.
From a defensive posture perspective, this flaw aligns with ATT&CK techniques related to exploitation for privilege escalation and defense evasion through kernel-level memory corruption. The root cause lies in the assumption that host-provided configuration data is trustworthy or bounded by implicit constraints rather than explicit validation rules. To mitigate this risk effectively, developers must enforce strict length checks at the earliest possible point of entry, which in this case is during the probe phase when the device configuration is initially parsed. By rejecting mount tags longer than NAME_MAX, defined as 255 characters, the kernel ensures that all subsequent operations remain within safe memory boundaries. This approach leverages an existing standard limit for file and directory names, providing a logical upper bound that is independent of sysfs implementation details like seq_file page sizes while remaining sufficiently high to accommodate legitimate use cases without requiring hard-coded constants tied to specific architecture page sizes.
Implementing this fix prevents the allocation of excessively large buffers based on untrusted input and eliminates the possibility of writing beyond the allocated or intended memory regions during sysfs exposure. It reinforces the principle of least privilege by ensuring that device drivers validate all external inputs before processing them further into kernel subsystems. Security practitioners should prioritize patching systems running affected versions of the Linux kernel to prevent potential exploitation via compromised virtio hosts in virtualized environments. Regular auditing of driver code for similar patterns where untrusted lengths are used directly in memory allocation or copy operations can help identify and remediate analogous vulnerabilities across other components of the operating system, thereby strengthening overall resilience against host-to-guest attack vectors.