Submit #1052044: Chaterm Chaterm Windows client 0.12.0 - 0.12.2 Code Injectioninfo

TitelChaterm Chaterm Windows client 0.12.0 - 0.12.2 Code Injection
BeschreibungCHATERM WINDOWS CLIENT — AUTO-UPDATE CHAIN PERFORMS NO SIGNATURE VALIDATION OF UPDATES (CWE-494): Product: Chaterm Windows client (github.com/Chaterm/Chaterm, open-source AI SSH/database asset management terminal, ~2.9k stars) Affected versions: v0.12.0 through v0.12.2 and current HEAD (app-update.yml verified verbatim in the shipped v0.12.0 and v0.12.2 bundles — identical; build configuration verified against HEAD on 2026-09-02). Earlier versions with the same generic-provider chain are presumed affected. Patched versions: none — unpatched 0day as of 2026-09-02 SUMMARY: The Windows client auto-update mechanism uses electron-updater with a generic provider pointing at the vendor CDN https://static-download.chaterm.net/: RESOURCES/APP-UPDATE.YML: provider: generic url: https://static-download.chaterm.net/ channel: latest updaterCacheDirName: chaterm-updater Neither app-update.yml nor the build configuration (electron-builder.global.yml, publish: and win: sections verified against current HEAD) sets publisherName. electron-updater on Windows verifies the Authenticode signature of downloaded NSIS installers only when publisherName is configured; without it, no signature check is performed. The repository contains scripts/sign-release-artifacts.sh (release assets ship cosign bundles), but electron-updater checks neither Authenticode via this chain nor cosign signatures — the signing capability is unused by the update path. Impact: any party controlling the update infrastructure (CDN/source compromise, domain hijack, or update-server write access) can publish a malicious latest.yml plus installer that clients download, execute, and install automatically, with no verification beyond transport TLS. Attacker position requires infrastructure-level compromise, not network adjacency. ROOT CAUSE: resources/app-update.yml ships provider: generic with no publisherName; the electron-builder build configuration (electron-builder.global.yml) likewise omits it (repository-wide search for publisherName returns zero hits). electron-updater's Windows NSIS verification is gated on publisherName; with it absent, downloaded update installers are executed without Authenticode verification. Note: the CDN hostname resolves to Akamai (CNAME a202.dscw27.akamai.net) with no dangling record — subdomain-takeover amplification is excluded; the finding is the missing second validation layer. VENDOR RESPONSE: Vendor contacted on 2026-09-02 via the SECURITY.md security email ([email protected]) with the full three-finding report; coordinating disclosure. No acknowledgement received as of the submission date. No fix exists. DEDUP METHODOLOGY: Queried 2026-10-04 (via 6696 egress): NVD keywordSearch=chaterm → 0 results; GitHub repository advisories for Chaterm/Chaterm → empty; GitHub global advisory search chaterm → 0 advisories. No existing CVE or GHSA covers this vulnerability. Honest caveat: unauthenticated repository-level advisory queries may under-report; NVD is the authoritative published-CVE registry and is clean; the in-flight MITRE ticket (2100886) has no CVE ID assigned yet. REPRODUCTION: 1. Install Chaterm on Windows and read resources\app-update.yml in the installation directory. 2. Observe provider: generic with no publisherName in the file or in electron-builder.global.yml (repository-wide search returns zero hits). 3. electron-updater therefore skips Windows Authenticode verification of downloaded update installers (documented electron-builder behavior). IMPACT: Automatic code execution on clients through the trusted update channel for any party with update-infrastructure control. CWE-494 (Download of Code Without Integrity Check). CVSS v3.1: AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N = 6.8 (Medium; AV:A/AC:H reflect the update-infrastructure attacker position, not network adjacency). FIX: Set win.publisherName in electron-builder.global.yml to Chaterm's Authenticode signing subject (one line), so electron-updater enforces signature validation on every downloaded installer. EXPOSURE: Open-source terminal with ~2.9k GitHub stars; Windows builds distributed via GitHub releases with an auto-update channel to the vendor CDN. No authoritative install-base counter obtained. HONEST BOUNDARIES: - Verification was static against the shipped v0.12.0/v0.12.2 bundles (app-update.yml verbatim) and the current HEAD build configuration. - The release-asset cosign signing is real but unused by the update chain; this distinction is stated in the finding (not conflated). - Materials assembled from the researcher's finalized field mapping and MITRE CNA-LR ticket (2026-09-02) plus the 2026-10-04 dedup queries. CVSS v3.1: AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N = 6.8. CWE-494. Vendor contacted 2026-09-02 ([email protected]); no acknowledgement, no fix. MITRE CNA-LR ticket 2100886 (MCID 15932673) was withdrawn by email on 2026-10-22 (Message-ID <[email protected]>).
Benutzer
 NeoWSY (UID 82976)
Einreichung22.10.2026 14:01 (vor 29 Tagen)
Moderieren20.11.2026 20:24 (29 days later)
StatusAkzeptiert
VulDB Eintrag441591 [Chaterm bis 0.12.2 auf Windows Auto-Update Mechanism resources/app-update.yml Information Disclosure]
Punkte17

Do you want to use VulDB in your project?

Use the official API to access entries easily!