| Título | harnessrouter >= 0.9.0, < 0.31.13 Server-Side Request Forgery |
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| Descripción | POST /v1/cloud-upload/targets and POST /v1/cloud-upload/targets/test take a base_url from the request body and call {base_url}/v1/me from the server to learn which workspace a key belongs to; an upload to a stored destination then calls {base_url}/v1/uhp. Neither call checked the address. Anyone holding an API key could make the server request any host and port, including private, loopback and link-local (cloud metadata) addresses, and read back the status the target answered with and the workspace fields it returned. MCP server, database and git addresses already passed the server's internal-address check; this path never called it. |
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| Fuente | ⚠️ https://github.com/HarnessRouter/harnessrouter/security/advisories/GHSA-c5g7-c47h-f6c3 |
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| Usuario | mikannse (UID 100854) |
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| Sumisión | 2026-10-08 04:07 (hace 14 días) |
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| Moderación | 2026-10-21 11:01 (13 days later) |
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| Estado | Aceptado |
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| Entrada de VulDB | 424709 [HarnessRouter hasta 0.31.12 Targets Test Endpoint gateway/app.py base_url escalada de privilegios] |
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| Puntos | 20 |
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