| Título | jsonata-js jsonata 2.2.0 Prototype Pollution |
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| Descripción | JSONata's function binding frame system creates bindings using a plain object ({}) and assigns values with bindings[name] = value without prototype chain validation. The for...in loop in the user bindings handler and createFrameFromTuple traverses the prototype chain, allowing attackers to override built-in functions. A novel bypass exists: passing a hasOwnProperty property in user bindings shadows the inherited Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty, bypassing the lookup() security check. This affects 63 built-in functions including $sum, $count, $eval, etc. |
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| Fuente | ⚠️ https://github.com/OriginSecurityX/jsonata-hasownproperty-bypass |
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| Usuario | Frederick (UID 98351) |
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| Sumisión | 2026-05-18 11:57 (hace 5 meses) |
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| Moderación | 2026-06-14 14:25 (27 days later) |
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| Estado | Aceptado |
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| Entrada de VulDB | 370850 [jsonata-js jsonata hasta 2.2.0 Function Binding Frame System src/jsonata.js createFrame] |
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| Puntos | 20 |
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