| Título | Sipeed PicoClaw <= 0.2.9 Server-Side Request Forgery (CWE-918) |
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| Descripción | # Technical Details
A Server-Side Request Forgery restriction bypass exists in the `web_fetch` IP classifier in `pkg/tools/integration/web.go` of PicoClaw.
The application fails to classify special-use non-global IPv4 ranges such as `x.x.x.x/15` as restricted. Both the preflight private-host check and connect-time dial guard rely on `isPrivateOrRestrictedIP`, whose IPv4 logic omits the benchmarking range.
# Vulnerable Code
File: `pkg/tools/integration/web.go`
Method: `WebFetchTool.Execute`
Why: Accepts attacker-controlled URLs and performs preflight SSRF decisions using `isObviousPrivateHost`.
File: `pkg/tools/integration/web.go`
Method: `newSafeDialContext`
Why: Re-checks literal IPs and resolved addresses, but depends on the same incomplete restricted-IP classifier.
File: `pkg/tools/integration/web.go`
Method: `isPrivateOrRestrictedIP` / `shouldBlockPrivateIP`
Why: Blocks RFC1918, loopback, link-local, and CGNAT ranges, but omits `x.x.x.x/15`.
# Reproduction
1. Invoke `web_fetch` with `http://x.x.x.x/internal`.
2. Observe the request passes preflight and connect-time checks.
3. Use a proxy/canary harness to confirm the request reaches the canary service.
4. Run a control with `http://10.0.0.1/...` and observe it is blocked.
# Impact
- Allows unauthorized outbound network access to special-use IPv4 destinations.
- Bypasses the product's intended egress policy for `web_fetch`.
- Can be used for internal HTTP probing or retrieval of sensitive internal responses in environments routing such ranges. |
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| Fuente | ⚠️ https://github.com/sipeed/picoclaw/issues/3077 |
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| Usuario | Eric-i (UID 97584) |
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| Sumisión | 2026-06-09 13:33 (hace 1 mes) |
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| Moderación | 2026-07-18 09:22 (1 month later) |
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| Estado | Aceptado |
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| Entrada de VulDB | 380012 [Sipeed PicoClaw hasta 0.2.9 web_fetch web.go isPrivateOrRestrictedIP escalada de privilegios] |
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| Puntos | 20 |
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