| Título | The Trusted Domain Project OpenDMARC 1.4.2 Improper Authentication |
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| Descripción | OpenDMARC 1.4.2 incorrectly expands the SPF `%{l}` macro to the fixed string `postmaster` when using its built-in SPF checker, `SPFSelfValidate`. For a non-null envelope sender, `%{l}` should expand to the local part of the checked identity. OpenDMARC instead applies the special null-sender substitution to every message.
As a result, an SPF mechanism such as `exists:%{l}._spf.%{d}` performs the DNS lookup for `postmaster._spf.example.com` rather than the actual sender-specific name, such as `alice._spf.example.com`. The domain portion is expanded correctly, but the authorization decision is made using the wrong local identity.
A remote unauthenticated attacker can exploit this behavior against a domain that uses `%{l}` for per-user SPF authorization. If the fixed `postmaster` lookup succeeds while the actual sender-specific lookup would fail, OpenDMARC may return `spf=pass`. When the SPF domain aligns with the visible `From:` domain, the incorrect result may also produce `dmarc=pass`, allowing forged mail to bypass a published `p=reject` policy.
The issue can also cause legitimate messages to fail because OpenDMARC never consults the sender’s actual per-user SPF entry. OpenDMARC should derive `%{l}` and `%{s}` from the checked identity and use `postmaster` only when the reverse path is null. |
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| Fuente | ⚠️ https://xuyongzhe-vt.github.io/share/opendmarc-spf-postmaster-macro.html |
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| Usuario | yongzhe_xu (UID 100420) |
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| Sumisión | 2026-08-07 06:15 (hace 2 meses) |
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| Moderación | 2026-09-28 13:53 (2 months later) |
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| Estado | Aceptado |
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| Entrada de VulDB | 411038 [Trusted Domain Project OpenDMARC hasta 1.4.2 SPF Macro opendmarc_spf.c opendmarc_sp2_find_mailfrom_domain autenticación débil] |
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| Puntos | 20 |
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