| Título | tdunning t-digest 3.2 Unvalidated Length Fields Enable Crash |
|---|
| Descripción | I was auditing t-digest 3.2's binary deserialization path for spots where untrusted bytes land directly on an array index or allocation size. MergingDigest.fromBytes(ByteBuffer) reads four attacker-controlled numeric fields (compression, n, bufferSize, lastUsedCell) straight off the wire and uses every one of them without a bounds check, so a handful of crafted bytes is enough to throw NegativeArraySizeException or ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException before a single real centroid gets parsed. I confirmed the same unvalidated code is still on master today, and found a real consumer — Apache Pinot's star-tree aggregator — that fed this exact method with raw ingested byte[] values with no validation of its own until a July 2026 hardening PR. |
|---|
| Fuente | ⚠️ https://github.com/tdunning/t-digest/issues/227 |
|---|
| Usuario | Yu Bao from PayPal Cyber Security Team (UID 99838) |
|---|
| Sumisión | 2026-08-14 03:36 (hace 2 meses) |
|---|
| Moderación | 2026-09-14 09:11 (1 month later) |
|---|
| Estado | Duplicado |
|---|
| Entrada de VulDB | 402019 [tdunning t-digest hasta 3.3 Serialization MergingDigest.fromBytes capacity desbordamiento de búfer] |
|---|
| Puntos | 0 |
|---|