| Titre | tdunning t-digest 3.2 Unvalidated Length Fields Enable Crash |
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| Description | I was auditing t-digest 3.2's binary deserialization path for spots where untrusted bytes land directly on an array index or allocation size. MergingDigest.fromBytes(ByteBuffer) reads four attacker-controlled numeric fields (compression, n, bufferSize, lastUsedCell) straight off the wire and uses every one of them without a bounds check, so a handful of crafted bytes is enough to throw NegativeArraySizeException or ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException before a single real centroid gets parsed. I confirmed the same unvalidated code is still on master today, and found a real consumer — Apache Pinot's star-tree aggregator — that fed this exact method with raw ingested byte[] values with no validation of its own until a July 2026 hardening PR. |
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| La source | ⚠️ https://github.com/tdunning/t-digest/issues/227 |
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| Utilisateur | Yu Bao from PayPal Cyber Security Team (UID 99838) |
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| Soumission | 14/08/2026 03:36 (il y a 2 mois) |
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| Modérer | 14/09/2026 09:11 (1 month later) |
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| Statut | Dupliqué |
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| Entrée VulDB | 402019 [tdunning t-digest jusqu’à 3.3 Serialization MergingDigest.fromBytes capacity buffer overflow] |
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| Points | 0 |
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