Submit #1013205: llSourcell Doctor-Dignity 0.1.dev0 (git commit 3f2ffb6, main HEAD, repository unchanged since 2023-09-20, no tagged releases) Code Injectioninfo

TitlellSourcell Doctor-Dignity 0.1.dev0 (git commit 3f2ffb6, main HEAD, repository unchanged since 2023-09-20, no tagged releases) Code Injection
DescriptionA vulnerability was found in Doctor-Dignity commit 3f2ffb6 and classified as high 8.8. Affected is the _get_lib_module function of the mlc_chat.chat_module component. The manipulation of the model_lib argument in a model package's mlc-chat-config.json leads to code injection: the string is used to build a shared-library file name that is searched inside the untrusted model package directory and passed to tvm.runtime.load_module, whose dlopen executes the library's ELF constructor before any TVM symbol is resolved. It is possible to launch the attack remotely by distributing a crafted model package; user interaction is required because the victim must load the package in an MLC-chat-based application. Technical Details - Affected file/function: python/mlc_chat/chat_module.py / _get_lib_module() lines 290-378, sink at lines 371-374 - Vulnerable parameter: model_lib string of mlc-chat-config.json inside the model package - Attack vector: Network (malicious model package distributed over the network) - Privileges required: None - Trigger condition: victim loads the crafted model package; on a CPU-only host the device suffix is llvm so the searched file is <model_lib>-llvm.so inside the package directory Impact - Confidentiality: High (arbitrary native code with victim user privileges inside the chat process) - Integrity: High (arbitrary native code with victim user privileges) - Availability: High (arbitrary native code with victim user privileges) CVSS v3.1 Score: 8.8 (High) Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H Timeline - Discovered: [unknown] - Vendor notified: [pending] - Patch released: [pending] - Public disclosure: [pending] Countermeasure Resolve model libraries only from a trusted location or allow-list, verify package-internal libraries against a signed or hashed manifest before tvm.runtime.load_module, and warn users when the resolved library resides inside the model package directory.
Source⚠️ https://github.com/llSourcell/Doctor-Dignity/issues/37
User
 Dem0000000 (UID 98743)
Submission10/04/2026 17:38 (17 days ago)
Moderation10/19/2026 07:18 (15 days later)
StatusAccepted
VulDB entry422245 [llSourcell Doctor-Dignity up to 3f2ffb6c892f13b50a708d05900d3227acb40ded chat_module.py _get_lib_module model_lib code injection]
Points20

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