| Title | H.R. Shadhin / CloudSchool (GitHub: hrshadhin) CloudSchool v3.0.1 Broken access control / IDOR |
|---|
| Description | Severity (audit estimate): High (7.1 High)
Repository: https://github.com/hrshadhin/school-management-system
Affected version/commit: Not established; tested stack Laravel 6.18.38 / PHP 7.4.33
Disclosure: Private report draft; do not post publicly before coordination
Endpoints: GET /public/get-student-result?student_id=N GET /public/get-student-attendance?student_id=N GET /public/get-student-subject?student_id=N
Method / Role: GET / any authenticated user — the route group ( routes/web.php:300-324 ) has only the auth middleware, no permission middleware.
Source file: app/Http/Controllers/Backend/PublicController.php:75-106,212-310 — checkSanity4Student() enforces ownership only when the caller's role is Student.
Confirmed: Yes — dynamically , with the lowest-privilege role (Librarian) and with Accountant.
Description
Three public JSON endpoints exposing student academic data are registered behind auth only.
The in-controller guard, checkSanity4Student() , checks resource ownership only when the
caller is a Student — every other authenticated role (Teacher, Accountant, Librarian, Receptionist, Parent —
roles holding only the 8 "Common" permissions) receives full data for any student_id .
The permission system is completely bypassed; ids are sequential integers, so enumeration of every student's
marks (including raw per-assessment JSON), grades, points, subjects and attendance is trivial. This defeats
the entire role/permission model for the application's most sensitive data class.
Taint trace
routes/web.php:300 — route group middleware => ['auth'] only (no permission middleware).
PublicController@getStudentResults (line 212): $studentId = $request->query->get('student_id',0) → Registration::where('id',$studentId) → $this->checkSanity4Student($student->student_id) .
checkSanity4Student() (lines 75–84): ownership check runs only inside if(session('user_role_id') == AppHelper::USER_STUDENT) ; non-student callers fall through with no check at all.
// PublicController.php:75-84 (abridged)
private function checkSanity4Student($id) {
if(session('user_role_id',0) == AppHelper::USER_STUDENT){
$studentInfo = auth()->user()->student;
if(!$studentInfo || $studentInfo->id != $id){ abort(401); }
}
// every other authenticated role: no ownership or permission check
}
Proof of concept
PoC — Librarian session (role_id=6, only 8 "Common" permissions)
# Authorization contrast — same session:
GET /student → HTTP 404 (permission denied — correct)
GET /report/student-list → HTTP 404 (permission denied — correct)
# Data endpoints — permission system bypassed:
GET /public/get-student-result?student_id=1 → HTTP 200
{"success":true,"data":[{"exam":"1st Term Exam","marks":[
{"marks":"{\"1\":24,\"2\":23,\"7\":0}","total_marks":47,"grade":"C","point":"2.00",
"subject":{"name":"Bangla 1st","code":"101"}}, … full marks, grades, points …]}
GET /public/get-student-attendance?student_id=1 → HTTP 200
[{"attendance_date":"04/10/2026","present":"Absent",…}, …]
GET /public/get-student-subject?student_id=1 → HTTP 200
{"data":[{"name":"Bangla 1st","code":"101","type":"Core"}, …]}
Assessment note: Confirmed: identical results reproduced with an Accountant-role session. Enumeration by incrementing student_id recovers every student's records.
Impact
Prerequisite: any authenticated account, including the least-privileged seeded roles.
Bulk disclosure of grades, attendance and enrollment data — the core confidentiality requirement of a school system. |
|---|
| Source | ⚠️ https://github.com/hrshadhin/school-management-system/issues/277 |
|---|
| User | ChetanPujari (UID 101747) |
|---|
| Submission | 10/21/2026 08:02 (30 days ago) |
|---|
| Moderation | 11/19/2026 22:43 (30 days later) |
|---|
| Status | Accepted |
|---|
| VulDB entry | 440882 [hrshadhin CloudSchool up to 3.0.1 Student Data Access Check PublicController.php PublicController.checkSanity4Student student_id authorization] |
|---|
| Points | 20 |
|---|