| Title | wonderwhy-er DesktopCommanderMCP 0.2.13 Improper Neutralization |
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| Description | Command Blocklist Bypass Via Command Substitution
The command validation logic in the CommandManager class class is vulnerable to a bypass when an attacker uses shell command substitution syntax, such as $(...) or backticks (`...`). The parser does not recognise or recursively validate commands nested within this syntax. This allows a blocked command (e.g., sudo) to be executed by embedding it within an allowed command (like echo).
This vulnerability allows a malicious actor to completely bypass the command blocklist, leading to arbitrary command execution. A malicious prompt could bypass the blocklist and run any command. The severity would vary depending on the privileges of the user running the server. |
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| Source | ⚠️ https://github.com/wonderwhy-er/DesktopCommanderMCP/issues/217 |
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| User | crem (UID 91252) |
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| Submission | 10/03/2025 07:16 (6 months ago) |
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| Moderation | 10/08/2025 12:53 (5 days later) |
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| Status | Accepted |
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| VulDB entry | 327610 [wonderwhy-er DesktopCommanderMCP up to 0.2.13 src/command-manager.ts CommandManager os command injection] |
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| Points | 20 |
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