| Title | Vvveb CMS v1.0.8.1 ssrf |
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| Description | The SSRF formation chain, code-level root cause, low-privilege reachability, and exploitation conditions of the backend editor endpoint /admin/index.php?module=editor/editor&action=oEmbedProxy
The low-privilege author role is granted editor/* by default
The IP restriction in validateUrl() is implemented incorrectly: it validates the full URL rather than the parsed hostname
Therefore, from a code-chain perspective, the complete formation path is:
A low-privilege backend account enters editor/editor
A request is made with action=oEmbedProxy
Editor::oEmbedProxy() directly reads $_GET['url']
getUrl() calls validateUrl()
validateUrl() attempts to block IPs, but the regex matches $url rather than $host
Addresses such as http://127.0.0.1/ and http://192.168.50.1/ bypass the validation
The server uses curl / file_get_contents to make the request and directly returns the response content to the attacker |
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| Source | ⚠️ https://github.com/myift/ideal-potato/blob/main/cve2/1/2/vvveb-editor-oembedproxy-ssrf-en.md |
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| User | myift (UID 86100) |
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| Submission | 04/22/2026 11:09 (3 months ago) |
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| Moderation | 05/16/2026 14:45 (24 days later) |
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| Status | Duplicate |
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| VulDB entry | 358309 [givanz Vvveb up to 1.0.8.0 file URL getUrl server-side request forgery] |
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| Points | 0 |
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