CVE-2001-1519 in Windows
Summary
by MITRE
** DISPUTED ** RunAs (runas.exe) in Windows 2000 allows local users to create a spoofed named pipe when the service is stopped, then capture cleartext usernames and passwords when clients connect to the service. NOTE: the vendor disputes this issue, saying that administrative privileges are already required to exploit it.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 02/20/2025
The vulnerability described in CVE-2001-1519 pertains to the RunAs service component in Windows 2000 operating systems, specifically addressing a security flaw in how the service handles named pipe communication. This issue arises from the service's behavior when it is stopped, creating a window of opportunity for local attackers to exploit the system. The vulnerability is classified under CWE-200, which deals with information exposure, and represents a significant concern for system security as it enables unauthorized credential capture. The RunAs service is designed to allow users to run applications with different user credentials, making it a critical component in Windows security architecture. When the service is not properly terminated, it leaves behind a named pipe that can be manipulated by malicious actors.
The technical flaw exploited in this vulnerability occurs when the RunAs service is stopped but fails to properly clean up its named pipe resources. Local users can create a spoofed named pipe with the same name as the legitimate RunAs service pipe, effectively intercepting communication between clients and the service. This spoofing mechanism allows attackers to capture cleartext credentials when legitimate clients attempt to connect to what they believe is the genuine RunAs service. The attack vector specifically targets the authentication process where users submit their usernames and passwords through the named pipe interface. This type of attack falls under the ATT&CK framework category of Credential Access, specifically targeting credential dumping techniques that exploit service communication channels. The vulnerability demonstrates a classic case of privilege escalation through service manipulation, where the attacker leverages the service's improper cleanup behavior to gain unauthorized access to authentication data.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple credential theft, as it represents a fundamental flaw in Windows 2000 service management and security boundaries. Local users who can create spoofed named pipes gain the ability to intercept and potentially exploit authentication information from any application or user attempting to utilize the RunAs service. This creates a persistent security risk where even legitimate system users could unknowingly provide their credentials to an attacker-controlled service. The attack requires local system access, which aligns with the vendor's assertion that administrative privileges are necessary for exploitation, though this does not diminish the severity of the vulnerability. The impact is particularly concerning in environments where multiple users interact with the RunAs service, as it could lead to widespread credential compromise. Organizations running Windows 2000 systems are particularly vulnerable due to the age of the operating system and lack of modern security controls that would prevent such spoofing attacks.
Mitigation strategies for this vulnerability should focus on implementing proper service termination procedures and enhancing system monitoring capabilities. The most effective approach involves ensuring that the RunAs service properly cleans up all named pipe resources when stopped, which can be achieved through system updates or custom security patches. Network administrators should implement monitoring for unauthorized named pipe creation and establish strict access controls for system services. The solution also requires proper privilege management, ensuring that only authorized administrative users have access to systems where the RunAs service operates. Security policies should mandate regular auditing of service states and named pipe usage to detect potential spoofing attempts. Additionally, organizations should consider implementing network segmentation and access control lists to limit communication between services and prevent unauthorized pipe interception. Given the age of Windows 2000, the most practical mitigation involves migrating to supported operating systems with modern security features that prevent such service manipulation attacks. The vulnerability serves as a reminder of the importance of proper resource cleanup in service design and the critical need for maintaining up-to-date security practices in legacy systems.