CVE-2002-0372 in Windows Media Player
Summary
by MITRE
Microsoft Windows Media Player versions 6.4 and 7.1 and Media Player for Windows XP allow remote attackers to bypass Internet Explorer s (IE) security mechanisms and run code via an executable .wma media file with a license installation requirement stored in the IE cache, aka the "Cache Path Disclosure via Windows Media Player".
If you want to get best quality of vulnerability data, you may have to visit VulDB.
Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 06/27/2021
This vulnerability exists in Microsoft Windows Media Player versions 6.4 and 7.1, as well as the Media Player included with Windows XP, representing a significant security flaw that undermines the core security model of Internet Explorer. The vulnerability specifically allows remote attackers to circumvent IE's security mechanisms through a carefully crafted media file that exploits the interaction between Windows Media Player and Internet Explorer's caching system. The flaw manifests when a malicious .wma file with license installation requirements is stored in the IE cache, creating an unexpected execution path that bypasses standard security controls. This represents a classic case of privilege escalation through indirect code execution, where the media player component inadvertently grants unauthorized access to system resources that should remain protected. The vulnerability directly relates to CWE-264, which addresses permissions, privileges, and access controls, and demonstrates how media processing applications can serve as attack vectors for broader system compromise.
The technical mechanism behind this vulnerability involves the improper handling of cache paths within the Windows Media Player component when processing media files that require license installation. When Internet Explorer encounters a .wma file that requires license installation, it stores the file in its cache directory structure. However, Windows Media Player does not properly validate or sanitize the cache path information, allowing the media player to execute code from the cached location without proper security checks. This creates a path traversal scenario where the media player accesses cached files through an insecure path resolution mechanism, essentially allowing attackers to execute arbitrary code from locations where they would normally be restricted. The vulnerability is particularly concerning because it leverages the trusted relationship between Internet Explorer and Windows Media Player, exploiting the implicit security assumptions that users and system administrators make about these components.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple code execution, as it provides attackers with a method to bypass multiple layers of security controls that are fundamental to protecting Windows systems. Attackers can leverage this vulnerability to execute malicious code with the privileges of the user running Internet Explorer, potentially leading to full system compromise if the user has administrative privileges. The vulnerability affects systems where Windows Media Player is installed, which was virtually all Windows systems at the time of disclosure, making it a widespread concern. The attack vector is particularly insidious because it can be delivered through standard web browsing activities, requiring no special user interaction beyond visiting a malicious website or opening a malicious media file. This aligns with ATT&CK technique T1059.007 for command and scripting interpreter, as the vulnerability enables remote code execution through media file processing, and T1068 for exploit for privilege escalation, since it allows code execution with elevated privileges.
Mitigation strategies for this vulnerability require a multi-layered approach that addresses both the immediate security flaw and the broader architectural issues that enabled the attack. System administrators should immediately apply Microsoft security patches that address the cache path handling issue in Windows Media Player, as the vulnerability was resolved through proper input validation and secure path resolution mechanisms. Organizations should also implement network-based restrictions that prevent access to untrusted media content and consider disabling Windows Media Player functionality in environments where it is not essential. Additionally, security monitoring should focus on cache directory access patterns and unusual code execution from cached media files, as this represents a novel attack vector that could be used in combination with other vulnerabilities. The vulnerability underscores the importance of proper input validation and secure coding practices, particularly in components that interact with system resources and caching mechanisms. This case study serves as a reminder of how media processing applications can introduce unexpected security risks when they do not properly validate file paths and handle cached content securely.