CVE-2006-0005 in Windows
Summary
by MITRE
Buffer overflow in the plug-in for Microsoft Windows Media Player (WMP) 9 and 10, when used in browsers other than Internet Explorer and set as the default application to handle media files, allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via HTML with an EMBED element containing a long src attribute.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 06/25/2025
This vulnerability represents a critical buffer overflow flaw in Microsoft Windows Media Player version 9 and 10 plugins that operates when the media player is configured as the default handler for media content within non-Internet Explorer browsers. The security issue stems from inadequate input validation mechanisms within the plugin's handling of the src attribute parameter within EMBED HTML elements, creating a condition where maliciously crafted HTML content can trigger memory corruption. The vulnerability specifically affects systems where Windows Media Player is set as the default application for media file handling, making it exploitable when users navigate to web pages containing maliciously constructed EMBED tags with excessively long src attributes. This buffer overflow condition occurs because the plugin fails to properly validate the length of the src parameter before copying it into a fixed-size buffer, allowing attackers to overwrite adjacent memory locations and potentially execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the affected user. The flaw is particularly dangerous because it leverages the default application association mechanism that many users configure without fully understanding the security implications. According to CWE classification, this represents a classic buffer overflow vulnerability categorized under CWE-121, which deals with stack-based buffer overflow conditions. The attack vector aligns with ATT&CK technique T1203, involving exploitation of software vulnerabilities through maliciously crafted content delivered via web browsers. The vulnerability's impact extends beyond simple code execution to potentially enable privilege escalation and system compromise, as the malicious code would run within the context of the Windows Media Player process. The flaw demonstrates how default application associations can create unexpected security exposure points when third-party plugins lack proper input sanitization mechanisms. Security researchers have noted that this vulnerability exploits the trust relationship between web browsers and default application handlers, where the browser delegates media content handling to the registered application without adequate validation of the content being passed. The technical implementation of this attack requires minimal sophistication from the attacker, as it only requires embedding a specially crafted HTML element with an overly long src attribute parameter. This vulnerability was particularly concerning because it could be triggered through standard web browsing activities without requiring any special user interaction beyond visiting a malicious website. The attack chain typically involves the user visiting a compromised website that delivers HTML content containing the malicious EMBED tag, which then triggers the vulnerable plugin when the browser attempts to render the media content. The vulnerability's exploitation capabilities align with ATT&CK tactic TA0002, focusing on execution through malicious content delivery. The lack of proper bounds checking in the plugin's source attribute handling creates a predictable memory corruption pattern that attackers can reliably exploit across affected Windows Media Player versions. This vulnerability also highlights the broader security implications of plugin-based architectures where third-party components can introduce unexpected attack surfaces that extend beyond the core application boundaries. The vulnerability's impact is amplified by the widespread use of Windows Media Player and the common practice of setting it as the default media handler for various content types. Microsoft's security advisory for this vulnerability emphasized the importance of proper input validation and buffer management in plugin development, aligning with industry best practices for secure coding. The vulnerability demonstrates how legacy plugin architectures can contain inherent security flaws that persist across multiple versions due to insufficient security testing during development phases. Organizations should consider implementing browser security policies that limit the execution of potentially dangerous plugins or disable automatic media handling for non-Internet Explorer browsers. The vulnerability also underscores the need for regular security assessments of third-party components and plugins that integrate with web browsers and operating system applications. This flaw represents a significant security gap in Microsoft's plugin security model and contributed to the broader industry shift toward more secure plugin architectures and sandboxed execution environments. The vulnerability's exploitation potential makes it particularly attractive to threat actors seeking to establish persistent access to compromised systems through web-based attack vectors.