CVE-2006-0633 in IP.Board
Summary
by MITRE
The make_password function in ipsclass.php in Invision Power Board (IPB) 2.1.4 uses random data generated from partially predictable seeds to create the authentication code that is sent by e-mail to a user with a lost password, which might make it easier for remote attackers to guess the code and change the password for an IPB account, possibly involving millions of requests.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 08/05/2017
The vulnerability described in CVE-2006-0633 represents a critical weakness in the password recovery mechanism of Invision Power Board version 2.1.4. This issue stems from the implementation of the make_password function within the ipsclass.php file, which generates authentication codes sent to users who have forgotten their passwords. The flaw lies in the randomness algorithm used to create these codes, specifically utilizing seeds that are partially predictable, creating a significant security risk for the affected web application.
The technical implementation of this vulnerability involves the use of pseudo-random number generation with insufficient entropy sources. When a user requests a password reset, the system generates an authentication code that should be cryptographically secure to prevent unauthorized access. However, the make_password function relies on random data generation that incorporates seeds which can be partially predicted by attackers, reducing the effective entropy of the generated codes. This weakness directly violates security principles outlined in CWE-330, which addresses the use of insufficiently random values in security-critical contexts. The predictability of these seeds means that an attacker could potentially generate the same sequence of random numbers given knowledge of the initial conditions, making brute force attacks significantly more feasible.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple password guessing, as it creates a pathway for account takeover attacks on a massive scale. An attacker could theoretically generate millions of requests to the password recovery system, attempting to guess valid authentication codes without triggering detection mechanisms that might be designed for more typical brute force patterns. This vulnerability particularly affects web applications that rely on email-based authentication tokens, where the attacker's goal is to exploit the weakness in the random number generation to gain unauthorized access to user accounts. The implications are severe for any organization using IPB 2.1.4, as successful exploitation could lead to complete account compromise and potential data breaches. The ATT&CK framework categorizes this vulnerability under privilege escalation and credential access techniques, specifically targeting the weakness in authentication mechanisms and the predictable nature of security tokens.
Mitigation strategies for this vulnerability require immediate implementation of cryptographic random number generation functions that utilize properly seeded entropy sources. Organizations should upgrade to newer versions of Invision Power Board where this vulnerability has been addressed through proper random number generation algorithms. The fix involves replacing the flawed make_password function with one that employs cryptographically secure random number generators, ensuring that each authentication code is generated from unpredictable seeds. Security practitioners should also implement rate limiting and account lockout mechanisms to prevent abuse of the password recovery feature, while monitoring for unusual patterns in password reset requests that might indicate attempted exploitation. Additionally, organizations should conduct thorough security assessments of all authentication mechanisms within their web applications to identify similar weaknesses in random number generation that could lead to comparable vulnerabilities.