CVE-2006-4694 in PowerPoint
Summary
by MITRE
Unspecified vulnerability in PowerPoint in Microsoft Office 2000, Office XP and Office 2003 allows user-assisted attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted record in a PPT file, as exploited by malware such as Exploit:Win32/Controlppt.W, Exploit:Win32/Controlppt.X, and Exploit-PPT.d/Trojan.PPDropper.F. NOTE: it has been reported that the attack vector involves SlideShowWindows.View.GotoNamedShow.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 04/09/2025
This vulnerability exists within the PowerPoint component of Microsoft Office versions 2000, XP, and 2003, representing a critical code execution flaw that enables remote attackers to compromise systems through malicious PowerPoint files. The vulnerability stems from inadequate input validation within the file parsing mechanism, specifically when processing crafted records within PowerPoint presentation files. Attackers can exploit this weakness by creating specially crafted PPT files that contain malicious records designed to trigger buffer overflows or other memory corruption conditions during the file parsing process. The vulnerability is classified as user-assisted, meaning that victims must actively open the malicious presentation file for the exploit to succeed, though the actual attack can occur through social engineering tactics or automated delivery mechanisms.
The technical exploitation occurs when PowerPoint processes the malformed records within the presentation file, particularly leveraging the SlideShowWindows.View.GotoNamedShow functionality as a primary attack vector. This particular method involves manipulating the slide show window's view properties to execute arbitrary code in the context of the currently running PowerPoint process. The vulnerability manifests as a classic stack-based buffer overflow or heap corruption issue where attacker-controlled data overflows allocated memory buffers, allowing the execution of malicious code with the privileges of the victim user. This flaw directly maps to CWE-121, which describes heap-based buffer overflow conditions, and CWE-125, which covers out-of-bounds read vulnerabilities that can lead to arbitrary code execution.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple code execution, as it provides attackers with persistent access to target systems through various malware families including Exploit:Win32/Controlppt.W, Exploit:Win32/Controlppt.X, and Exploit-PPT.d/Trojan.PPDropper.F. These malware variants leverage the vulnerability to establish backdoors, download additional payloads, or perform reconnaissance activities within the compromised network. The attack surface is particularly concerning given that PowerPoint files are commonly shared through email attachments, file transfers, and web downloads, making this vulnerability highly exploitable in real-world scenarios. The Office 2000, XP, and 2003 versions were widely deployed in enterprise environments, amplifying the potential impact of successful exploitation.
Security mitigations for this vulnerability include immediate application of Microsoft security patches, which address the underlying buffer overflow conditions through proper input validation and memory management. Organizations should implement strict file access controls and disable automatic execution of PowerPoint files from untrusted sources. Network-based protections such as email filtering and web content filtering can help prevent delivery of malicious PowerPoint files to end users. Additionally, security awareness training should emphasize the dangers of opening unexpected PowerPoint files, particularly those received via email or downloaded from untrusted websites. The ATT&CK framework categorizes this vulnerability under T1203, which covers Exploitation for Execution, and T1059, which covers Command and Scripting Interpreter, as attackers typically leverage the compromised system to execute additional malicious commands or scripts. System administrators should also consider implementing application whitelisting policies that restrict execution of PowerPoint files unless they originate from trusted sources and have undergone proper security validation.