CVE-2007-1264 in Enigmail
Summary
by MITRE
Enigmail 0.94.2 and earlier does not properly use the --status-fd argument when invoking GnuPG, which prevents Enigmail from visually distinguishing between signed and unsigned portions of OpenPGP messages with multiple components, which allows remote attackers to forge the contents of a message without detection.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 01/13/2025
The vulnerability identified as CVE-2007-1264 affects Enigmail versions 0.94.2 and earlier, representing a critical flaw in the OpenPGP message signing and verification process. This issue stems from improper handling of the --status-fd argument when executing GnuPG commands, which fundamentally undermines the cryptographic integrity verification mechanisms that Enigmail relies upon. The flaw creates a situation where the email client cannot accurately distinguish between signed and unsigned components within OpenPGP messages containing multiple parts, effectively breaking the core security promise of digital signatures.
The technical implementation of this vulnerability lies in how Enigmail interfaces with GnuPG's status file descriptor functionality. When GnuPG processes OpenPGP messages, it typically writes status information to a designated file descriptor that indicates the verification results for different message components. However, Enigmail's improper use of the --status-fd argument means that this status information is either not properly captured or not correctly interpreted by the email client. This misconfiguration results in a false positive scenario where unsigned content appears to be properly signed, or conversely, signed content may be incorrectly marked as unsigned.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe and directly compromises the security assurances that users expect from OpenPGP encryption. Remote attackers can exploit this weakness to craft malicious messages that appear to contain valid signatures while actually containing forged content. This allows for sophisticated social engineering attacks where attackers can make unsigned messages appear legitimate, bypassing the cryptographic verification mechanisms that protect against message tampering. The vulnerability essentially creates a blind spot in the signature verification process, enabling attackers to manipulate message contents without detection by the recipient.
This vulnerability aligns with CWE-295, which addresses improper certificate validation, and relates to ATT&CK technique T1566 for social engineering through forged communications. The flaw represents a breakdown in the cryptographic verification chain that undermines trust in digital signatures, making it particularly dangerous in environments where message integrity is critical. Organizations relying on Enigmail for secure communications face significant risk of undetected message tampering, potentially leading to data breaches, financial fraud, or other security incidents. The vulnerability also demonstrates poor input validation and improper system interaction patterns that could serve as a template for similar flaws in other cryptographic software implementations.
The recommended mitigation involves upgrading to Enigmail versions that properly implement the --status-fd argument handling, ensuring that all message components are correctly verified and displayed. System administrators should also implement additional monitoring for suspicious message patterns and consider deploying supplementary security controls to detect potential signature forgery attempts. Organizations should conduct thorough security assessments of their email encryption infrastructure to identify any other potentially affected systems or applications that might exhibit similar behavior patterns.