CVE-2007-1265 in K-Mail
Summary
by MITRE
KMail 1.9.5 and earlier does not properly use the --status-fd argument when invoking GnuPG, which prevents KMail from visually distinguishing between signed and unsigned portions of OpenPGP messages with multiple components, which allows remote attackers to forge the contents of a message without detection.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 08/26/2018
The vulnerability described in CVE-2007-1265 affects KMail versions 1.9.5 and earlier, specifically targeting the integration between KMail and GnuPG for OpenPGP message processing. This flaw stems from improper handling of the --status-fd argument during GnuPG invocation, which fundamentally undermines the cryptographic verification mechanisms that should distinguish between signed and unsigned message components. The issue represents a critical breakdown in the security model that relies on proper status file descriptor usage to provide visual feedback to users about message authenticity.
The technical flaw manifests when KMail processes OpenPGP messages containing multiple components, where the application fails to correctly interpret GnuPG's status information through the designated file descriptor. This misconfiguration prevents the email client from properly parsing the status codes that GnuPG generates to indicate whether specific parts of a message are signed or unsigned. According to CWE-284 access control flaws, this vulnerability represents a failure in proper privilege management and status interpretation within the cryptographic processing pipeline. The underlying mechanism relies on GnuPG's status file descriptor interface which provides structured feedback about cryptographic operations, but KMail's implementation does not correctly utilize this information.
Operationally, this vulnerability creates a significant attack surface that allows remote adversaries to craft malicious OpenPGP messages that appear legitimate to users. Attackers can exploit this flaw to insert forged content within signed messages without detection, as the user interface fails to indicate that certain portions of the message have been tampered with. The impact extends beyond simple message modification, potentially enabling sophisticated social engineering attacks where attackers can manipulate content while maintaining the appearance of cryptographic authenticity. This weakness directly violates the principle of integrity verification that OpenPGP is designed to provide, as described in the ATT&CK technique T1566 for credential access through spoofing.
The security implications of this vulnerability are particularly concerning given that KMail's user interface would present the message as properly signed, leading users to trust content that has been modified by an attacker. This creates a false sense of security that could be exploited in targeted attacks against individuals or organizations relying on PGP encryption for sensitive communications. The flaw essentially allows for a form of cryptographic spoofing where the attacker can bypass the signature verification process entirely, as the visual distinction between signed and unsigned components becomes unreliable. Organizations implementing email security policies based on PGP signatures may experience false confidence in their security posture, potentially leading to successful social engineering or data compromise attempts. Mitigation efforts should focus on updating to KMail versions that properly implement GnuPG status file descriptor handling, as well as implementing additional verification mechanisms such as message integrity checks and user education about cryptographic verification practices.