CVE-2007-1267 in Sylpheed
Summary
by MITRE
Sylpheed 2.2.7 and earlier does not properly use the --status-fd argument when invoking GnuPG, which prevents Sylpheed from visually distinguishing between signed and unsigned portions of OpenPGP messages with multiple components, which allows remote attackers to forge the contents of a message without detection.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 08/26/2018
The vulnerability identified as CVE-2007-1267 affects Sylpheed email client versions 2.2.7 and earlier, specifically targeting the implementation of OpenPGP message signature verification. This flaw resides in how the application handles the --status-fd argument when interfacing with GnuPG, creating a critical gap in cryptographic message integrity verification. The issue stems from improper handling of the status file descriptor parameter that GnuPG uses to communicate signature verification results back to the calling application.
The technical implementation flaw occurs when Sylpheed processes OpenPGP messages containing multiple signed and unsigned components. The application fails to correctly interpret the status information provided by GnuPG through the --status-fd mechanism, resulting in a complete breakdown of visual distinction between authenticated and unauthenticated portions of multipart messages. This misconfiguration effectively renders the cryptographic signature verification process ineffective, as the client cannot properly identify which parts of a message have been verified against the sender's digital signature.
From an operational perspective, this vulnerability creates a significant attack surface for remote adversaries who can exploit the flawed verification mechanism to forge message contents without detection. Attackers can craft malicious OpenPGP messages where unsigned portions appear to be signed, potentially leading to successful social engineering attacks or data manipulation attempts. The impact extends beyond simple message tampering, as users may unknowingly trust forged content that appears to be properly signed, undermining the fundamental security guarantees provided by OpenPGP encryption.
The vulnerability aligns with CWE-254, which addresses weaknesses in cryptographic implementations related to improper handling of security parameters. This flaw also maps to ATT&CK technique T1566, specifically targeting the manipulation of digitally signed messages to bypass security controls. Organizations relying on Sylpheed for secure email communications face potential data integrity compromise, as the application fails to provide the expected cryptographic assurance that users depend upon when processing sensitive information through encrypted channels.
Mitigation strategies should prioritize immediate upgrade to Sylpheed version 2.3.0 or later, which contains the necessary patches to properly handle the --status-fd argument. System administrators should also implement additional verification measures such as manual signature checking procedures and consider alternative email clients with more robust cryptographic implementations. Network monitoring should be enhanced to detect unusual patterns in message processing that might indicate exploitation attempts, while security awareness training should emphasize the importance of verifying message integrity beyond automated client verification mechanisms.