CVE-2007-3626 in TPBroker
Summary
by MITRE
Unspecified vulnerability in the ADM daemon in Hitachi TPBroker before 20070706 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (daemon crash) via a certain request.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 09/05/2018
The vulnerability identified as CVE-2007-3626 resides within the ADM daemon component of Hitachi TPBroker software, a middleware product designed for enterprise application integration and transaction processing. This unspecified weakness in the daemon implementation creates a remote attack vector that can be exploited by unauthorized actors to trigger a denial of service condition. The vulnerability specifically affects versions of Hitachi TPBroker released prior to the 20070706 patch release, indicating that the flaw was present in the software for several months before remediation became available. The ADM daemon serves as a critical communication component within the TPBroker framework, handling various transactional requests and maintaining system stability for enterprise applications that depend on this middleware infrastructure.
The technical nature of this vulnerability manifests through a specific type of malformed or crafted request that when processed by the ADM daemon causes the service to crash and terminate unexpectedly. This daemon crash represents a fundamental failure in the software's input validation and error handling mechanisms, where the system does not properly sanitize or validate incoming requests before processing them. The vulnerability's classification as a denial of service issue indicates that attackers can repeatedly send these specially crafted requests to overwhelm the daemon's processing capabilities or exploit memory management flaws that lead to system instability. According to CWE taxonomy, this vulnerability aligns with CWE-121, which describes heap-based buffer overflow conditions, or potentially CWE-122, which covers buffer overflow conditions in stack-based memory. The daemon's failure to properly handle exceptional conditions during request processing creates an opportunity for remote exploitation that does not require authentication or specialized privileges.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple service disruption, as it can severely affect enterprise transaction processing environments that rely on Hitachi TPBroker for critical business operations. When the ADM daemon crashes, it can interrupt ongoing transactions, cause application timeouts, and potentially lead to data inconsistency issues within the enterprise systems. The remote nature of the attack means that malicious actors can exploit this weakness from outside the network perimeter without requiring physical access or insider knowledge of the system. Organizations using vulnerable versions of TPBroker may experience significant downtime during attack periods, with potential cascading effects on dependent applications and services. From an ATT&CK framework perspective, this vulnerability maps to T1499.004, which covers network denial of service attacks, and potentially T1210, which addresses exploitation of remote services. The vulnerability's impact is particularly concerning for mission-critical enterprise environments where middleware reliability directly correlates with business continuity and operational efficiency.
Organizations affected by this vulnerability should immediately implement the patch released by Hitachi on July 6, 2007, which addresses the specific daemon crash issue. Network segmentation and access control measures should be implemented to limit exposure of vulnerable systems to untrusted networks, while monitoring systems should be configured to detect unusual daemon restart patterns or high-volume request patterns that may indicate exploitation attempts. Security teams should also consider implementing intrusion detection systems with signatures specifically designed to identify the exploitation patterns associated with this vulnerability. Additionally, organizations should conduct thorough vulnerability assessments to identify all instances of vulnerable TPBroker installations within their environment, particularly in critical transaction processing systems where the impact of daemon crashes would be most severe. The remediation process should include comprehensive testing to ensure that the patch does not introduce compatibility issues with existing applications or transaction processing workflows. Regular vulnerability scanning and patch management procedures should be enhanced to prevent similar issues from occurring in the future, with particular attention to middleware components that handle critical enterprise transactions and communications.