CVE-2026-17123 in Royal Addons Plugin
Summary
by MITRE • 08/16/2026
The Royal Elementor Addons plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery in versions up to, and including, 1.7.1064 via the Form Builder widget's 'webhook_url' setting. The widget's render() method persists the attacker-controlled URL into the wpr_webhook_url_{widget_id} option on every render (including a Contributor previewing their own draft), and the wpr_form_builder_webhook AJAX handler — registered for both authenticated and unauthenticated callers — reads that option and dispatches the outbound request via the non-safe wp_remote_post(), with no host allowlist, no scheme restriction, and no private/loopback IP filter (the plugin's existing wpr_is_blocked_remote_host / wpr_is_private_or_local_ip helpers are not called on this path). This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Contributor-level access and above, to make web requests to arbitrary locations originating from the web application and can be used to query and modify information from internal services.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 08/16/2026
The Royal Elementor Addons plugin for WordPress contains a critical server-side request forgery vulnerability that affects versions up to and including 1.7.1064. This vulnerability exists within the Form Builder widget's webhook_url functionality, creating a dangerous pathway for attackers to manipulate outbound requests from the affected web application. The flaw stems from how the widget's render() method processes user-controlled input by persisting attacker-supplied URLs into the WordPress options table under the wpr_webhook_url_{widget_id} key. This persistence occurs during every render operation, including when contributors preview their own drafts, making the vulnerability accessible even to users with relatively low privileges.
The technical implementation of this vulnerability involves multiple layers of insecure processing that compound the risk. The plugin registers an AJAX handler named wpr_form_builder_webhook which is accessible to both authenticated and unauthenticated users, creating a broad attack surface. When this handler executes, it reads the persisted attacker-controlled URL from the WordPress options table and uses the non-secure wp_remote_post() function to dispatch outbound requests. This approach completely bypasses standard security measures that would normally protect against such attacks, including host allowlists, scheme restrictions, and private/loopback IP filters that are otherwise implemented within the plugin's codebase.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends significantly beyond simple data exfiltration. Attackers with Contributor-level access or higher can leverage this weakness to make web requests to arbitrary locations originating from the target web application, effectively using the WordPress installation as a proxy for attacking internal services. This capability allows for reconnaissance of internal networks, potential exploitation of vulnerable internal systems, and modification of information within those services. The vulnerability particularly dangerous because it operates at a level that can bypass typical network segmentation controls, enabling attackers to probe internal infrastructure that would normally be protected by firewalls or other network security measures.
This vulnerability maps directly to CWE-918, Server-Side Request Forgery, which specifically addresses the issue of untrusted inputs being used to make HTTP requests from web applications. The ATT&CK framework categorizes this as a technique for "Web Service" and "Remote Code Execution" through the exploitation of insecure deserialization or manipulation of application components. The lack of host allowlists, scheme restrictions, and IP filtering mechanisms in the affected code path represents a failure to implement proper input validation and sanitization. Security best practices dictate that all external requests should be validated against a whitelist of approved hosts, restricted to secure protocols such as HTTPS only, and filtered to prevent access to private network addresses. The fact that existing security helpers like wpr_is_blocked_remote_host and wpr_is_private_or_local_ip are not invoked on this particular code path demonstrates a critical oversight in the plugin's security architecture.
Mitigation strategies should begin with immediate patching of the affected plugin versions, as well as implementing network-level restrictions to prevent outbound requests to internal services from the web application server. Administrators should consider implementing firewall rules that block outbound connections to private IP ranges from the WordPress server, and establish strict access controls for the AJAX endpoints. Additionally, monitoring should be implemented to detect unusual patterns of outbound requests that might indicate exploitation attempts. For environments where immediate patching is not possible, administrators should consider temporarily disabling the Form Builder widget functionality or implementing application-level restrictions on the wp_remote_post() calls. The vulnerability underscores the importance of validating all user inputs and implementing proper request filtering mechanisms in web applications to prevent attackers from leveraging legitimate application functionality for malicious purposes.