CVE-2007-4410 in ircu
Summary
by MITRE
ircu 2.10.12.05 and earlier does not properly synchronize a kick action in certain cross scenarios, which allows remote authenticated operators to prevent later kick or de-op actions from non-local ops.
If you want to get best quality of vulnerability data, you may have to visit VulDB.
Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 09/07/2018
The vulnerability identified as CVE-2007-4410 affects ircu version 2.10.12.05 and earlier, representing a critical synchronization flaw within the IRC server implementation that impacts operational integrity and access control mechanisms. This issue specifically manifests during cross-server kick operations where the server fails to properly coordinate the sequence of events when kick actions are initiated across different server connections. The flaw stems from inadequate thread or process synchronization mechanisms that govern how kick commands are processed and propagated through the IRC network infrastructure.
The technical implementation of this vulnerability resides in the server's handling of cross-server communication protocols where kick operations are not properly serialized or coordinated between different server instances. When an authenticated operator executes a kick command from a remote server, the system fails to maintain proper state synchronization across the network topology. This synchronization failure creates a race condition where subsequent kick or de-op commands from non-local operators become effectively blocked or ignored, as the system maintains an inconsistent operational state. The vulnerability is particularly concerning because it allows malicious operators to gain persistent control over channel operations by preventing legitimate administrative actions from taking effect.
From an operational perspective, this vulnerability creates a significant escalation of privilege scenario where remote authenticated operators can effectively disable administrative controls within IRC channels. The impact extends beyond simple denial of service as it fundamentally undermines the access control model of the IRC network by allowing unauthorized manipulation of channel operations. Attackers can exploit this weakness to maintain persistent control over channels, prevent legitimate administrators from removing problematic users, or block de-operations that would normally be available to local operators. The vulnerability particularly affects networks that rely on distributed server architectures where cross-server operations are common, making it a critical concern for large-scale IRC implementations.
The flaw demonstrates characteristics consistent with CWE-362, which addresses race conditions in concurrent programming, and aligns with ATT&CK technique T1484.001 related to Domain Policy Modification. This vulnerability essentially allows attackers to modify the operational policies of IRC channels by preventing legitimate administrative actions from executing properly. The attack surface is limited to authenticated operators who can leverage this weakness, but the potential for persistent control makes it particularly dangerous in environments where channel management is critical. Organizations should implement immediate mitigation strategies including upgrading to patched versions of ircu, implementing additional access controls, and monitoring for suspicious operator activities that might indicate exploitation attempts.
Mitigation efforts should focus on ensuring all ircu installations are updated to versions that address the synchronization flaw, with particular attention to cross-server communication protocols. Network administrators should implement strict access controls for operator privileges and monitor operator command sequences for unusual patterns that might indicate exploitation of this vulnerability. The solution fundamentally requires proper synchronization mechanisms within the IRC server implementation to ensure that kick operations are properly coordinated across server boundaries. Additional defensive measures include implementing operational procedures that can detect and respond to persistent kick command failures, as well as maintaining detailed logs of operator activities that can help identify exploitation attempts and their impact on network operations.