CVE-2007-6103 in I Hear U
Summary
by MITRE
I Hear U (IHU) 0.5.6 and earlier allows remote attackers to cause (1) a denial of service (infinite loop) via a packet that contains zero in the size field in its header, which is improperly handled by the Receiver::processPacket function; and (2) a denial of service (daemon crash) via an (a) IHU_INFO_INIT or a (b) IHU_INFO_RING packet that does not specify the mode, which is improperly handled by the Player::ring function in Player.cpp.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 01/23/2025
The vulnerability identified as CVE-2007-6103 affects I Hear U (IHU) version 0.5.6 and earlier, a multimedia streaming application that processes audio and video data packets. This vulnerability presents two distinct denial of service conditions that can be exploited remotely by attackers to disrupt the normal operation of the IHU daemon. The first vulnerability occurs when a malicious packet contains a zero value in the size field of its header, while the second vulnerability manifests when specific IHU_INFO_INIT or IHU_INFO_RING packets lack proper mode specification. Both issues stem from inadequate input validation and error handling within the IHU application's packet processing logic.
The technical flaw in the Receiver::processPacket function demonstrates a classic lack of boundary checking and input sanitization. When a packet with a zero size field is received, the function fails to properly validate this condition, leading to an infinite loop that consumes system resources and prevents the daemon from processing subsequent packets. This represents a CWE-129 vulnerability, specifically related to insufficient validation of the length field in packet headers. The second vulnerability in the Player::ring function within Player.cpp occurs when IHU_INFO_INIT or IHU_INFO_RING packets are received without specifying the required mode parameter. The function does not implement proper null checking or parameter validation, causing the daemon to crash when attempting to process these malformed packets. This vulnerability aligns with CWE-835, which addresses infinite loops caused by improper handling of loop termination conditions.
The operational impact of these vulnerabilities extends beyond simple service disruption, as they can be exploited by remote attackers to maintain persistent denial of service conditions. The infinite loop vulnerability can be particularly damaging in networked environments where the IHU daemon serves multiple clients, as it can consume CPU resources indefinitely and prevent legitimate users from accessing streaming services. The daemon crash vulnerability creates an additional attack vector that can be used to repeatedly restart the service, leading to service unavailability. Both conditions can be exploited without authentication, making them particularly dangerous in environments where the IHU service is exposed to untrusted networks. The vulnerabilities fall under the ATT&CK technique T1499.004, which describes network denial of service attacks, and T1566.002, which covers spearphishing via social media.
Mitigation strategies should focus on implementing comprehensive input validation and robust error handling within the IHU application. The Receiver::processPacket function requires immediate patching to validate size fields and implement proper boundary checks to prevent infinite loop conditions. The Player::ring function must be updated to include null checks for mode parameters and implement graceful error handling for malformed packets. System administrators should consider implementing network segmentation and access controls to limit exposure of IHU services to untrusted networks. Additionally, regular security updates and patches should be applied to ensure that all known vulnerabilities are addressed. The implementation of intrusion detection systems can help identify exploitation attempts, while monitoring for unusual resource consumption patterns can alert administrators to potential infinite loop conditions. Organizations should also consider deploying network-based firewalls to filter out malformed packets before they reach the IHU daemon, reducing the attack surface and providing an additional layer of defense against these specific vulnerabilities.