CVE-2010-1189 in MediaWikiinfo

Summary

by MITRE

MediaWiki before 1.15.2 does not prevent wiki editors from linking to images from other web sites in wiki pages, which allows editors to obtain IP addresses and other information of wiki users by adding a link to an image on an attacker-controlled web site, aka "CSS validation issue."

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Analysis

by VulDB Data Team • 05/04/2026

The vulnerability identified as CVE-2010-1189 represents a significant security flaw in MediaWiki versions prior to 1.15.2 that stems from inadequate validation of external image references within wiki pages. This issue specifically relates to the improper handling of cross-site image linking functionality, where wiki editors could embed images from external websites directly into wiki content. The flaw occurs because MediaWiki failed to properly sanitize or validate the sources of image references, allowing malicious actors to exploit this functionality for reconnaissance purposes.

The technical nature of this vulnerability falls under CWE-200, which describes "Information Exposure," and more specifically aligns with CWE-119, "Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer," when considering how external resources are processed. The vulnerability operates by leveraging the standard image embedding mechanism in wiki pages, where editors can reference images using markup syntax that includes external URLs. When users view wiki pages containing these external image references, their browsers attempt to fetch the images from the specified external domains, creating an information leakage scenario.

The operational impact of this vulnerability is particularly concerning as it enables attackers to perform passive reconnaissance against wiki users without requiring any active exploitation. When a user loads a wiki page containing an external image link, their browser makes an HTTP request to the attacker-controlled server hosting the image. This request includes the user's IP address, browser information, and potentially other identifying headers that can be collected by the attacker. The vulnerability essentially transforms the wiki page viewing experience into a data collection mechanism, allowing adversaries to track who accesses specific wiki content and potentially correlate this information with user identities.

This issue directly relates to ATT&CK technique T1566.002, "Phishing with Social Engineering," as it enables attackers to gather intelligence about wiki users through seemingly benign image references. The vulnerability also connects to T1071.004, "Application Layer Protocol: DNS," since the external image requests may reveal DNS resolution patterns and network behavior. Additionally, it demonstrates characteristics of T1082, "System Information Discovery," by allowing attackers to collect information about user systems through browser requests.

The mitigation strategy for this vulnerability involves upgrading to MediaWiki version 1.15.2 or later, which includes proper validation of external image references and implementation of security controls to prevent the automatic loading of external resources. Organizations should also implement Content Security Policy headers to restrict external resource loading, configure firewall rules to limit outbound connections from wiki servers, and establish strict policies for image embedding within wiki content. Regular security audits of wiki configurations and monitoring for suspicious external link patterns can further reduce the risk of exploitation. The vulnerability highlights the importance of input validation and the principle of least privilege in web application security, particularly when dealing with user-generated content that can reference external resources.

Reservation

03/30/2010

Disclosure

03/31/2010

Moderation

accepted

Entry

VDB-52488

CPE

ready

EPSS

0.01760

KEV

no

Activities

very low

Sources

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