CVE-2010-3142 in PowerPoint
Summary
by MITRE
Untrusted search path vulnerability in Microsoft Office PowerPoint 2007 allows local users, and possibly remote attackers, to execute arbitrary code and conduct DLL hijacking attacks via a Trojan horse rpawinet.dll that is located in the same folder as a .odp, .pothtml, .potm, .potx, .ppa, .ppam, .pps, .ppt, .ppthtml, .pptm, .pptxml, .pwz, .sldm, .sldx, and .thmx file.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 02/07/2019
The vulnerability described in CVE-2010-3142 represents a critical untrusted search path issue affecting Microsoft Office PowerPoint 2007 that enables both local and remote attackers to execute arbitrary code through DLL hijacking techniques. This flaw stems from PowerPoint's improper handling of dynamic link library loading when processing various presentation file formats including .odp, .potm, .ppt, .ppam, and numerous others that share the same directory structure. The vulnerability specifically manifests when the system encounters a malicious rpawinet.dll file positioned within the same folder as the targeted presentation document, creating a dangerous execution environment where attacker-controlled code can be loaded and executed with the privileges of the user running PowerPoint.
From a technical perspective, this vulnerability aligns with CWE-427 Uncontrolled Search Path Element, which occurs when an application searches for libraries in directories that are not properly validated or restricted. The flaw operates through the Windows DLL loading mechanism where PowerPoint attempts to resolve library dependencies by searching in the current working directory before checking system directories, creating an opportunity for attackers to place malicious DLLs in the same folder as presentation files. This behavior follows the classic DLL hijacking pattern where attackers exploit the search order by placing malicious libraries in directories that are searched before legitimate system libraries, allowing them to intercept and execute code when the application loads.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple code execution to encompass broader security implications including privilege escalation and potential system compromise. Local attackers can exploit this by placing malicious DLLs in directories containing presentation files, while remote attackers can potentially deliver malicious presentations through email attachments or web downloads. The attack surface is particularly wide given that PowerPoint 2007 supports multiple presentation formats, each of which could be used to deliver the malicious payload. This vulnerability also maps to ATT&CK technique T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter where adversaries use PowerPoint as a delivery mechanism to execute malicious code, and T1574.002 Hijack Execution Flow which specifically targets DLL hijacking methods.
Mitigation strategies for CVE-2010-3142 should include immediate patching of affected systems with Microsoft security updates, implementing strict file execution policies that restrict DLL loading from user directories, and employing application whitelisting solutions that prevent unauthorized DLL execution. Organizations should also implement network segmentation and monitoring to detect suspicious file transfers containing potentially malicious DLLs in presentation file directories. The vulnerability underscores the importance of proper privilege separation and secure coding practices in application development, particularly regarding library loading mechanisms and search path validation. Additionally, users should be educated about the risks of opening presentation files from untrusted sources and the importance of maintaining up-to-date security patches across all Microsoft Office installations to prevent exploitation of similar vulnerabilities in the broader attack surface.