CVE-2010-3689 in OpenOffice
Summary
by MITRE
soffice in OpenOffice.org (OOo) 3.x before 3.3 places a zero-length directory name in the LD_LIBRARY_PATH, which allows local users to gain privileges via a Trojan horse shared library in the current working directory.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 08/01/2024
The vulnerability identified as CVE-2010-3689 affects OpenOffice.org versions 3.x prior to 3.3, specifically within the soffice executable component. This issue represents a classic privilege escalation vulnerability that exploits how the application handles dynamic library loading through the LD_LIBRARY_PATH environment variable. The flaw occurs when the soffice process initializes and sets up its library search path, creating a security risk that can be exploited by local attackers.
The technical root cause of this vulnerability lies in the improper handling of the LD_LIBRARY_PATH environment variable during application startup. When OpenOffice.org processes execute, they incorporate a zero-length directory name into the library search path, effectively inserting an empty string as a directory component. This empty directory component translates to the current working directory in Unix-like operating systems, creating a dangerous condition where libraries can be loaded from arbitrary locations. The vulnerability is categorized under CWE-427 Uncontrolled Search Path Element, which specifically addresses situations where applications fail to properly control the directories searched for dynamic libraries.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is significant for systems running affected versions of OpenOffice.org. Local attackers can exploit this weakness by placing malicious shared libraries in the current working directory from which the soffice process is executed. When the application attempts to load required libraries, it will first search the current directory due to the zero-length directory entry in LD_LIBRARY_PATH, potentially loading and executing attacker-controlled code with the privileges of the OpenOffice process. This privilege escalation can lead to unauthorized system access, data compromise, or further exploitation of the compromised system.
This vulnerability aligns with several ATT&CK techniques including privilege escalation through dynamic link library injection and execution through trojan horses. The attack vector specifically maps to T1055.001 Process Injection and T1068 Local Privilege Escalation, as it allows local users to execute code with elevated privileges. The exploitation requires the attacker to have access to the system and the ability to place files in directories where OpenOffice.org processes are executed, making it particularly concerning in multi-user environments where users might inadvertently execute malicious documents or scripts.
Mitigation strategies for this vulnerability involve immediate patching to OpenOffice.org version 3.3 or later, which addresses the improper LD_LIBRARY_PATH handling. System administrators should also implement proper file permissions and directory access controls to limit where users can place executable files. Additionally, the principle of least privilege should be enforced by running OpenOffice.org processes with minimal required permissions and avoiding execution from directories containing untrusted content. The vulnerability serves as a reminder of the importance of secure library loading practices and proper environment variable handling in application security design.