CVE-2010-3831 in iOS
Summary
by MITRE
Photos in Apple iOS before 4.2 enables support for HTTP Basic Authentication over an unencrypted connection, which allows man-in-the-middle attackers to read MobileMe account passwords by spoofing a MobileMe Gallery server during a "Send to MobileMe" action.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 06/16/2017
The vulnerability described in CVE-2010-3831 represents a critical security flaw in Apple iOS versions prior to 4.2 that fundamentally undermines the confidentiality of user credentials during mobile synchronization operations. This weakness specifically affects the MobileMe service integration within iOS devices, where the operating system's handling of HTTP Basic Authentication over unencrypted connections creates an exploitable attack vector for malicious actors positioned within the network traffic path. The vulnerability manifests when users attempt to send photos to their MobileMe Gallery servers through the iOS interface, creating an opportunity for attackers to intercept and manipulate authentication credentials.
The technical implementation of this flaw stems from iOS's inadequate security controls during HTTP communication with MobileMe services. When the "Send to MobileMe" functionality is utilized, the iOS device establishes an unencrypted HTTP connection to the MobileMe Gallery server, transmitting credentials using HTTP Basic Authentication. This authentication method, while simple to implement, inherently exposes credentials in plaintext form within network traffic, making them susceptible to interception by attackers who can position themselves between the device and the server. The vulnerability is particularly dangerous because it operates at the transport layer without proper encryption or authentication mechanisms to verify server identity, leaving users vulnerable to sophisticated man-in-the-middle attacks that can capture and exploit their MobileMe account passwords.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple credential theft, creating a comprehensive security risk for iOS users who rely on MobileMe for photo storage and synchronization. Attackers exploiting this flaw can not only access MobileMe account credentials but can also potentially gain unauthorized access to users' photo collections, personal data, and associated account settings. The attack requires minimal sophistication to execute, as it leverages the inherent weakness in the HTTP implementation rather than requiring complex exploitation techniques. This vulnerability particularly affects enterprise users and individuals who store sensitive personal information in MobileMe services, as the captured credentials can be used to access additional services that may share the same authentication mechanisms.
Security professionals should note that this vulnerability aligns with CWE-312 (CWE-312: Cleartext Storage of Sensitive Information) and CWE-319 (CWE-319: Cleartext Transmission of Sensitive Information) classifications, demonstrating the critical importance of implementing secure communication protocols for sensitive data transmission. The attack pattern follows the MITRE ATT&CK framework's technique T1071.004 (Application Layer Protocol: DNS) and T1566 (Phishing) as attackers can leverage this vulnerability to establish persistent access to user accounts. Organizations should implement immediate mitigations including mandatory encryption requirements for all MobileMe communications, network monitoring to detect suspicious traffic patterns, and user education about the risks of unencrypted network connections. The most effective remediation involves upgrading to iOS 4.2 or later versions where Apple implemented proper HTTPS encryption and certificate validation for MobileMe services, eliminating the plaintext credential exposure that made this vulnerability exploitable.
The broader implications of this vulnerability highlight the critical importance of secure communication protocols in mobile operating systems and demonstrate how seemingly minor implementation flaws can create significant security risks. This case study serves as a reminder of the necessity for comprehensive security testing of network communication mechanisms and the importance of implementing end-to-end encryption for sensitive data transmission. The vulnerability also underscores the need for robust certificate validation and server authentication mechanisms that prevent attackers from impersonating legitimate services during credential exchange operations.