CVE-2010-5165 in Malware Defender
Summary
by MITRE
** DISPUTED ** Race condition in Malware Defender 2.6.0 on Windows XP allows local users to bypass kernel-mode hook handlers, and execute dangerous code that would otherwise be blocked by a handler but not blocked by signature-based malware detection, via certain user-space memory changes during hook-handler execution, aka an argument-switch attack or a KHOBE attack. NOTE: this issue is disputed by some third parties because it is a flaw in a protection mechanism for situations where a crafted program has already begun to execute.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 08/07/2024
The vulnerability described in CVE-2010-5165 represents a significant race condition within Malware Defender 2.6.0's kernel-mode hook handlers on Windows XP systems. This flaw operates at the intersection of kernel security mechanisms and user-mode execution contexts, creating a potential pathway for privilege escalation and code execution bypass. The vulnerability specifically targets the timing and execution flow of kernel-mode protection handlers that are designed to intercept and block malicious activities before they can fully manifest. The race condition occurs during the execution of hook handlers when user-space memory modifications coincide with kernel-mode processing, creating a temporal window where protection mechanisms can be circumvented.
The technical implementation of this vulnerability relies on what is commonly known as an argument-switch attack or KHOBE (Kernel Hook Obfuscation and Exploitation) technique. This attack pattern exploits the fundamental timing characteristics of kernel-mode hook execution, where the malicious code manipulation occurs precisely during the window between when a hook handler begins processing and when it completes its validation checks. The flaw allows local users to manipulate memory structures in user-space that are being referenced by kernel-mode handlers, effectively causing the protection mechanism to operate on incorrect data or parameters. This creates a scenario where malicious code that would normally be blocked by the hook handlers can execute successfully, while still evading signature-based detection mechanisms that rely on pattern matching rather than behavioral analysis.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple bypass of security controls, as it fundamentally undermines the trust model of kernel-mode protection systems. When exploited, this vulnerability enables attackers to execute code that would normally be blocked by the kernel-mode hook handlers, potentially leading to privilege escalation, system compromise, and persistent access. The attack vector requires local system access, making it less severe than remote exploitation vulnerabilities, but still represents a critical weakness in endpoint protection mechanisms. The vulnerability demonstrates the inherent complexity of kernel-mode security implementations and how timing-sensitive protections can be compromised through careful manipulation of execution contexts, particularly in older Windows XP environments where security model assumptions may differ from modern operating systems.
From a cybersecurity perspective, this vulnerability aligns with several common attack patterns documented in the attack framework, including privilege escalation techniques and kernel exploitation methods. The issue relates to CWE-362, which describes race conditions that can lead to security vulnerabilities, and demonstrates how timing-based flaws in kernel-mode code can be exploited to bypass security controls. The disputed nature of this vulnerability reflects ongoing debates within the security community about whether such flaws represent legitimate security issues or represent edge cases in protection mechanisms where malicious code has already begun execution. Organizations implementing endpoint protection solutions must understand that kernel-mode hooking systems, while powerful for security enforcement, can become vulnerable when subjected to precise timing attacks that exploit the temporal nature of their execution flow, particularly in legacy operating systems like Windows XP where modern security mitigations may not be fully implemented.