CVE-2010-5166 in Total Protection 2010
Summary
by MITRE
** DISPUTED ** Race condition in McAfee Total Protection 2010 10.0.580 on Windows XP allows local users to bypass kernel-mode hook handlers, and execute dangerous code that would otherwise be blocked by a handler but not blocked by signature-based malware detection, via certain user-space memory changes during hook-handler execution, aka an argument-switch attack or a KHOBE attack. NOTE: this issue is disputed by some third parties because it is a flaw in a protection mechanism for situations where a crafted program has already begun to execute.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 08/07/2024
The vulnerability described in CVE-2010-5166 represents a critical race condition within McAfee Total Protection 2010 version 10.0.580 on Windows XP systems that fundamentally undermines the kernel-mode protection mechanisms designed to prevent malicious code execution. This flaw operates at the intersection of kernel-mode security controls and user-mode memory manipulation, creating a pathway for local attackers to circumvent active protection measures that would normally block suspicious activities. The vulnerability specifically targets the hook handler mechanism that McAfee employs to monitor and control system calls, effectively allowing attackers to exploit timing dependencies during the execution of these security checks. The race condition occurs when user-space processes modify memory locations that are being actively monitored by kernel-mode hook handlers, creating a temporal window where the protection system becomes temporarily ineffective.
The technical implementation of this vulnerability leverages what is commonly referred to as an argument-switch attack or KHOBE (Kernel Hook Obfuscation Exploitation) technique, where malicious code manipulates the arguments passed to kernel functions during hook execution. This approach exploits the fundamental timing characteristics of the Windows kernel and McAfee's protection implementation, allowing attackers to modify memory contents while hook handlers are processing, thereby causing the protection system to operate on incorrect or manipulated data. The attack vector specifically targets the window of opportunity between when a hook handler begins processing a system call and when it completes, enabling the malicious code to alter the execution context in ways that bypass signature-based detection while still exploiting the kernel-mode protection mechanisms. This technique directly relates to CWE-362, which describes race conditions in concurrent programming, and represents a sophisticated exploitation of temporal dependencies in security systems.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple privilege escalation, as it fundamentally compromises the integrity of the kernel-mode protection framework that McAfee provides. Local users who can successfully exploit this vulnerability can effectively bypass the very mechanisms designed to prevent malware execution, potentially allowing for the execution of code that would normally be blocked by the hook handlers but remains undetected by signature-based systems. This creates a dangerous scenario where attackers can execute malicious code that operates at kernel level while maintaining the appearance of legitimate system activity, making detection significantly more difficult. The vulnerability essentially transforms McAfee's active protection mechanisms from a security enhancement into a potential attack vector, undermining the trust model that users place in the antivirus solution. Attackers can leverage this flaw to execute privileged code that would otherwise be prevented by the system's hook-based protection, creating a persistent threat that can evade traditional security controls.
Mitigation strategies for this vulnerability must address both the immediate exploitation vector and the underlying architectural issues that enable the race condition. System administrators should ensure that McAfee Total Protection 2010 is updated to the latest available version that addresses this specific race condition, though vendors may have discontinued support for this older product line. The recommended approach involves implementing additional memory protection mechanisms that prevent user-space processes from modifying kernel-mode data structures during hook execution, effectively closing the temporal window that enables the attack. Organizations should also consider implementing runtime application control measures that can detect and prevent the specific memory manipulation patterns associated with KHOBE attacks, as outlined in the MITRE ATT&CK framework under techniques related to process injection and kernel-mode exploitation. Additionally, the implementation of kernel-mode exploit protection features such as Data Execution Prevention and address space layout randomization can help mitigate the impact of such vulnerabilities by making successful exploitation more difficult and less predictable.