CVE-2010-5170 in Online Solutions Security Suite
Summary
by MITRE
** DISPUTED ** Race condition in Online Solutions Security Suite 1.5.14905.0 on Windows XP allows local users to bypass kernel-mode hook handlers, and execute dangerous code that would otherwise be blocked by a handler but not blocked by signature-based malware detection, via certain user-space memory changes during hook-handler execution, aka an argument-switch attack or a KHOBE attack. NOTE: this issue is disputed by some third parties because it is a flaw in a protection mechanism for situations where a crafted program has already begun to execute.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 08/07/2024
The vulnerability described in CVE-2010-5170 represents a sophisticated race condition within the Online Solutions Security Suite version 1.5.14905.0, specifically targeting Windows XP operating systems. This security flaw operates at the kernel level and exploits a timing vulnerability that allows local attackers to circumvent active kernel-mode hook handlers designed to block malicious code execution. The attack mechanism leverages a technique known as argument-switch or KHOBE (Kernel Hook Obfuscation Evasion) where adversaries manipulate user-space memory during the execution of kernel-mode handlers to bypass security controls that would normally intercept and block dangerous operations.
The technical implementation of this vulnerability stems from a race condition that occurs when kernel-mode hook handlers are actively processing user-space requests. During the brief window between when a hook handler begins execution and when it completes its processing, an attacker can modify user-space memory structures that the handler relies upon. This timing discrepancy creates an opportunity for malicious code to be executed in a manner that appears benign to signature-based detection systems while simultaneously bypassing the kernel-mode protections that would normally intercept such operations. The vulnerability specifically targets the security suite's attempt to prevent execution of potentially harmful code through kernel-mode hooks, which are typically implemented to monitor and control system calls from user-space applications.
From an operational perspective, this vulnerability presents significant risk to systems running the affected security suite, particularly in environments where Windows XP remains operational despite its end-of-life status. The attack vector requires local system access, making it less immediately dangerous than remote exploits, but it represents a critical weakness in the security suite's design that could be exploited by attackers who have already gained a foothold on a system. The vulnerability essentially undermines the fundamental premise of kernel-mode protection mechanisms by allowing attackers to manipulate the very system calls that are supposed to be monitored and controlled. This type of attack falls under the ATT&CK framework's technique T1089, which covers avoiding analysis by tampering with system processes, and demonstrates how sophisticated attackers can exploit timing vulnerabilities in security software itself.
The disputed nature of this vulnerability stems from the fact that it operates within a protection mechanism designed for scenarios where malicious code has already begun execution, rather than preventing initial compromise. Security researchers have questioned whether this represents a legitimate vulnerability or simply an inherent limitation in how protection mechanisms function when faced with sophisticated evasion techniques. However, the vulnerability's existence demonstrates a critical flaw in the security suite's architecture and highlights the importance of considering race conditions in kernel-mode code. The issue relates to CWE-362, which describes race conditions in concurrent programming, and specifically addresses the challenge of maintaining security in systems where timing attacks can be used to subvert protection mechanisms. Organizations should consider this vulnerability as evidence of inadequate design in the security suite's hook management system and evaluate whether alternative approaches to kernel-mode protection might be more effective against such sophisticated evasion techniques.
Mitigation strategies for this vulnerability should focus on both immediate defensive measures and long-term architectural improvements. System administrators should disable or remove the vulnerable Online Solutions Security Suite until a patched version is available, as the vulnerability's nature makes it difficult to defend against through conventional means. Organizations should also implement additional monitoring to detect unusual kernel-mode activity and user-space memory modifications that might indicate exploitation attempts. The vulnerability underscores the importance of proper synchronization mechanisms in kernel-mode code and the need for security software to account for timing attacks during hook handler execution. Given that this vulnerability affects a protection mechanism itself, organizations should consider implementing layered security approaches that do not rely solely on kernel-mode hooks for protection, and should prioritize upgrading from unsupported Windows XP systems to more modern platforms with better security features and ongoing support.