CVE-2010-5182 in Virusbuster Internet Securit Suite
Summary
by MITRE
** DISPUTED ** Race condition in VirusBuster Internet Security Suite 3.2 on Windows XP allows local users to bypass kernel-mode hook handlers, and execute dangerous code that would otherwise be blocked by a handler but not blocked by signature-based malware detection, via certain user-space memory changes during hook-handler execution, aka an argument-switch attack or a KHOBE attack. NOTE: this issue is disputed by some third parties because it is a flaw in a protection mechanism for situations where a crafted program has already begun to execute.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 08/16/2018
The vulnerability described in CVE-2010-5182 represents a sophisticated race condition within the kernel-mode hook handler mechanism of VirusBuster Internet Security Suite version 3.2 running on Windows XP systems. This flaw operates at the intersection of operating system security architecture and application-level protection mechanisms, creating a pathway for privilege escalation and code execution that bypasses traditional signature-based detection methods. The vulnerability specifically targets the timing-sensitive execution of kernel-mode components that are designed to monitor and intercept user-mode operations, making it particularly dangerous in enterprise environments where such security suites are commonly deployed.
The technical implementation of this vulnerability exploits a race condition during the execution of kernel-mode hook handlers, which constitutes a classic timing-based security flaw that falls under CWE-362. During the brief window when hook handlers are processing user-space memory modifications, an attacker can manipulate argument values or memory states that would normally be intercepted and blocked by the security suite's protection mechanisms. This argument-switch attack pattern, also known as KHOBE (Kernel Hook Obfuscation Exploitation), leverages the temporal vulnerability in the hook execution process to effectively disable or circumvent the very protections that are meant to prevent malicious code execution. The attack requires local user privileges and takes advantage of the asynchronous nature of kernel-mode operations to execute code that would otherwise be flagged by signature-based detection systems.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple bypass of security controls, as it represents a fundamental weakness in the design of kernel-mode protection systems. Attackers can leverage this flaw to execute arbitrary code with elevated privileges, potentially leading to complete system compromise and persistence within the target environment. The vulnerability's ability to bypass both kernel-mode hook handlers and signature-based detection creates a particularly dangerous attack vector because it operates at multiple security layers simultaneously. This makes it especially concerning for enterprise environments where VirusBuster is deployed as a primary security solution, as it effectively undermines the layered defense strategy that organizations rely upon for protection against advanced persistent threats.
The disputed nature of this vulnerability stems from the fact that it exploits a protection mechanism that is specifically designed to defend against scenarios where malicious programs have already begun execution. This creates a philosophical debate within the security community about whether such flaws should be classified as vulnerabilities or as inherent limitations of defensive architectures. The attack vector requires an attacker to already have local execution privileges, which means the vulnerability represents a privilege escalation issue rather than an initial compromise vector. Security professionals should consider this when evaluating risk assessments and remediation strategies, as the vulnerability's exploitation requires pre-existing access to the target system, making it less likely to be exploited in initial compromise scenarios but still dangerous for environments where local access exists.
Mitigation strategies for this vulnerability must address both the immediate technical flaw and the broader architectural considerations of kernel-mode protection systems. Organizations should implement immediate patch management procedures to ensure all instances of VirusBuster 3.2 are updated to versions that resolve the race condition. Additionally, system administrators should consider implementing additional security controls such as kernel patch protection, driver signature enforcement, and monitoring for suspicious kernel-mode activity. The vulnerability also highlights the importance of proper software testing for race conditions in security-critical applications, particularly those that operate at kernel mode where errors can have catastrophic consequences for system security. Compliance with industry standards such as those outlined in the MITRE ATT&CK framework's kernel-mode exploitation techniques should guide the development of defensive strategies against similar vulnerabilities in other security products.
This vulnerability demonstrates the complex interplay between security architecture design and implementation flaws, particularly in systems that attempt to provide real-time protection through kernel-mode hooking mechanisms. The race condition represents a failure in proper synchronization and timing controls within the security suite's kernel components, which is a common pattern in security-critical software where timing-sensitive operations must be carefully managed to prevent exploitation. Organizations should conduct thorough vulnerability assessments of their security infrastructure to identify similar timing-based flaws in other protection mechanisms, as the principles underlying this vulnerability apply to a broader class of kernel-mode security implementations that may be susceptible to similar race condition attacks.