CVE-2011-1652 in Windows
Summary
by MITRE
** DISPUTED ** The default configuration of Microsoft Windows 7 immediately prefers a new IPv6 and DHCPv6 service over a currently used IPv4 and DHCPv4 service upon receipt of an IPv6 Router Advertisement (RA), and does not provide an option to ignore an unexpected RA, which allows remote attackers to conduct man-in-the-middle attacks on communication with external IPv4 servers via vectors involving RAs, a DHCPv6 server, and NAT-PT on the local network, aka a "SLAAC Attack." NOTE: it can be argued that preferring IPv6 complies with RFC 3484, and that attempting to determine the legitimacy of an RA is currently outside the scope of recommended behavior of host operating systems.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 08/07/2024
The vulnerability described in CVE-2011-1652 represents a significant security flaw in the network stack configuration of Microsoft Windows 7 operating systems. This issue stems from the default behavior of the Windows 7 network protocol stack which prioritizes IPv6 connectivity over IPv4 when processing IPv6 Router Advertisement messages. The fundamental problem lies in the operating system's preference for stateless address autoconfiguration and dynamic host configuration protocol version 6 over traditional IPv4 DHCPv4 mechanisms, creating a potential attack vector that can be exploited by malicious actors within the local network segment.
The technical implementation of this vulnerability involves the Windows 7 operating system's network stack immediately switching to IPv6 services upon receiving an IPv6 Router Advertisement message, without providing any mechanism to ignore unexpected or unauthorized advertisements. This behavior creates a scenario where an attacker positioned on the local network can send malicious router advertisements that cause the victim machine to establish communication paths through the attacker's network infrastructure. The vulnerability specifically affects the interaction between IPv6 stateless address autoconfiguration, DHCPv6 service provisioning, and NAT-PT (Network Address Translation - Protocol Translation) functionality that enables IPv4-to-IPv6 communication, creating a complex attack surface that can be exploited for man-in-the-middle attacks.
The operational impact of this vulnerability extends beyond simple network disruption to encompass full communication interception and potential data manipulation capabilities. Attackers can leverage this flaw to redirect traffic from external IPv4 servers through their controlled network infrastructure, effectively enabling them to monitor, modify, or block communications between the compromised Windows 7 machine and external services. The attack requires only local network access and does not necessitate elevated privileges or complex exploitation techniques, making it particularly dangerous in shared network environments such as corporate offices, public Wi-Fi networks, or residential gateways where attackers may have physical or network access to the local segment.
Security professionals should note that while this vulnerability has been disputed by some experts who argue that IPv6 preference aligns with RFC 3484 standards for routing policy, the practical implications remain significant for network security. The issue relates to CWE-1104 which addresses the lack of proper configuration controls for network protocols and ATT&CK technique T1071.004 which covers application layer protocol usage for command and control communications. Organizations should implement network segmentation and monitoring to detect unauthorized router advertisements, disable unnecessary IPv6 functionality where not required, and consider implementing network access control measures to prevent unauthorized devices from broadcasting router advertisements on local networks. The vulnerability highlights the importance of understanding default security configurations and the potential risks introduced by protocol preferences that may not align with security requirements in all network environments.