CVE-2013-4037 in System X3250 M4
Summary
by MITRE
The RAKP protocol support in the Intelligent Platform Management Interface (IPMI) implementation in Integrated Management Module (IMM) and Integrated Management Module II (IMM2) on IBM BladeCenter, Flex System, System x iDataPlex, and System x3### servers sends a password hash to the client, which makes it easier for remote attackers to obtain access via a brute-force attack.
If you want to get best quality of vulnerability data, you may have to visit VulDB.
Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 06/29/2017
The vulnerability identified as CVE-2013-4037 affects the Remote Authentication Protocol (RAKP) implementation within the Intelligent Platform Management Interface (IPMI) framework of several IBM server models including BladeCenter, Flex System, System x iDataPlex, and System x3### platforms. This security flaw resides in the Integrated Management Module (IMM) and Integrated Management Module II (IMM2) firmware components that provide out-of-band management capabilities for these enterprise servers. The issue specifically manifests in how the RAKP protocol handles authentication challenges, creating a significant security weakness that undermines the integrity of the IPMI management interface.
The technical flaw stems from the improper implementation of the RAKP protocol where the server sends password hashes to the client during the authentication process rather than implementing proper cryptographic challenge-response mechanisms. This design decision fundamentally weakens the security posture by exposing sensitive authentication data that should remain protected within the server's secure enclave. The vulnerability creates a condition where attackers can capture these password hashes and subsequently perform offline brute-force attacks against the exposed credentials, significantly reducing the time and computational resources required to compromise the management interface.
From an operational impact perspective, this vulnerability represents a critical threat to enterprise server security as it enables remote attackers to gain unauthorized access to the IPMI management interfaces without requiring physical presence or prior knowledge of valid credentials. The exposure of password hashes through the RAKP protocol creates a direct pathway for attackers to bypass traditional authentication controls and potentially gain full administrative control over the affected servers. This capability extends beyond simple credential theft to encompass complete system compromise, including the ability to modify system configurations, extract sensitive data, or establish persistent backdoors within the management infrastructure.
The vulnerability aligns with CWE-256, which addresses "Incorrectly Implemented Authentication" and reflects patterns commonly found in the ATT&CK framework under the T1078 technique for Valid Accounts and T1566 for Phishing. Organizations running affected IBM server models face heightened risk of targeted attacks specifically designed to exploit this weakness, particularly in environments where IPMI interfaces are accessible from untrusted networks or where default credentials are not properly changed. The security implications extend beyond individual server compromise to potentially affect entire data center management infrastructures that rely on IPMI for remote monitoring and control operations.
Mitigation strategies should prioritize immediate credential rotation and implementation of network segmentation to isolate IPMI management interfaces from general network traffic. Organizations must ensure that all affected servers receive firmware updates from IBM that properly implement the RAKP protocol according to established security standards. Network-based solutions including firewalls and intrusion detection systems should be configured to monitor and restrict access to IPMI ports, while security policies should mandate the use of strong, unique passwords and implement account lockout mechanisms to prevent brute-force attacks. Additionally, administrators should consider disabling IPMI interfaces when not actively required for management operations and regularly audit management access logs for suspicious activities that could indicate exploitation attempts against this vulnerability.