CVE-2026-64797 in IP Login Plugin
Summary
by MITRE • 07/23/2026
IP Login trusted forwarded client-IP headers without requiring a configured trusted proxy. Attackers could spoof the IP used for automatic login and potentially impersonate mapped accounts.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 07/23/2026
This vulnerability represents a critical authentication bypass flaw that stems from improper handling of client IP address validation within the IP Login system. The core technical issue occurs when the application accepts and trusts forwarded client IP headers without requiring explicit configuration of trusted proxy servers, creating a dangerous trust relationship that can be easily exploited by malicious actors. The flaw resides in the application's failure to implement proper source verification mechanisms, allowing attackers to manipulate HTTP headers such as X-Forwarded-For or X-Real-IP to present falsified IP addresses. According to CWE-284, this represents an authorization weakness where the system grants inappropriate access based on unverified identity information, while the ATT&CK framework categorizes this under privilege escalation techniques through spoofing of network attributes.
The operational impact of this vulnerability is severe and multifaceted, as it enables attackers to bypass authentication mechanisms entirely by simply crafting malicious HTTP requests with spoofed IP addresses. When combined with account mapping functionality, an attacker who can successfully spoof a trusted IP address could automatically log into accounts associated with that IP, effectively impersonating legitimate users without needing valid credentials or knowledge of account passwords. This creates a pathway for unauthorized access to sensitive data, system resources, and potentially lead to further lateral movement within the network infrastructure. The vulnerability is particularly dangerous because it operates at the network layer authentication boundary, where most security controls assume proper IP address validation has occurred.
Mitigation strategies must focus on implementing strict proxy header validation and establishing explicit trust relationships for forwarded headers. Organizations should configure their applications to only accept forwarded headers from explicitly defined trusted proxy servers, using whitelisting approaches rather than relying on IP-based trust assumptions. The implementation should include mandatory configuration parameters that define which proxy servers are authorized to provide forwarded client IP information, with the application rejecting any forwarded headers that originate from untrusted sources. Additionally, security controls should enforce multi-factor authentication and implement additional verification mechanisms beyond simple IP address validation to prevent unauthorized access even if IP spoofing attempts are successful.
The vulnerability demonstrates a fundamental flaw in network security architecture where trust is assumed based on header content without proper source verification, aligning with CWE-345 Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity patterns. Organizations should also implement monitoring and alerting mechanisms that detect unusual IP address patterns or sudden changes in authentication sources to identify potential exploitation attempts. Regular security assessments should verify that all forwarded headers are properly validated against known trusted proxy configurations, and that automatic login systems do not rely solely on IP address information for authentication decisions. This approach aligns with defense-in-depth strategies recommended by NIST SP 800-53 and other cybersecurity frameworks to ensure that multiple independent controls work together to prevent unauthorized access attempts.