CVE-2026-75531 in Pandora
Summary
by MITRE • 08/17/2026
Pandora contains a stored cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the rendering of URL observables. A URL extracted from or associated with an analyzed file was inserted directly into the inline JavaScript onclick handler used by the Submit to Lookyloo action.
Although the value was subject to HTML escaping by the template engine, it was embedded inside a JavaScript string within an HTML attribute. An attacker-controlled URL containing specially crafted characters could therefore break out of the JavaScript string and inject arbitrary JavaScript code.
The malicious script would execute in the context of the Pandora web application when a victim interacts with the affected Submit to Lookyloo control. Successful exploitation could allow an attacker to access information available to the victim's browser or perform actions using the victim's authenticated Pandora session.
The patch removes the observable value from the inline JavaScript handler. The URL is instead stored in an HTML data-url attribute and retrieved through the DOM dataset API when needed. Additional uses of innerHTML were also replaced with textContent as defensive hardening.
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Analysis
by VulDB Data Team • 08/17/2026
Pandora, a widely used open-source intrusion detection system (IDS) framework based on Snort, contains a critical stored cross-site scripting vulnerability within its web interface component responsible for handling URL observables. This flaw specifically affects the rendering of URLs extracted from or associated with analyzed files when users attempt to submit these URLs to Lookyloo, an online tool designed for analyzing suspicious websites and detecting phishing attempts. The vulnerability arises because the application directly inserts user-controlled URL data into inline JavaScript onclick handlers without sufficient sanitization against script injection vectors that can bypass HTML escaping mechanisms in specific contexts.
The technical root cause of this flaw lies in how the template engine processes input values within dynamic web pages. Although the system applies standard HTML entity encoding to prevent basic tag-based injections, it fails to adequately escape special characters when embedding these values inside JavaScript strings defined as part of an HTML attribute. This creates a context where specially crafted URL inputs containing specific delimiters such as single quotes or parentheses can break out of the intended string boundary. Once outside this protective layer, an attacker can inject arbitrary JavaScript code that becomes executable within the browser environment hosting the Pandora application interface.
From an operational perspective, this vulnerability allows for significant impact on system security and user privacy. When a victim with authenticated access to the Pandora platform interacts with the compromised Submit to Lookyloo control element, the malicious script executes in the context of their active session. This execution grants attackers the ability to perform actions as the legitimate user, potentially leading to unauthorized data exfiltration, manipulation of system configurations, or further exploitation through subsequent interactions within the application. The stored nature of this vulnerability means that once a malicious URL is ingested and saved by an analyst or automated process, it remains persistent until manually removed, increasing the window of opportunity for exploitation against any user who views the affected record.
This incident aligns with Common Weakness Enumeration identifier CWE-79, which classifies improper neutralization of input during web page generation as a primary category for cross-site scripting flaws. Furthermore, from an adversary tactics perspective, this vulnerability facilitates initial access and credential harvesting consistent with MITRE ATT&CK technique T1059, specifically code execution via browser-based scripts. The ability to execute arbitrary commands within the trusted context of the Pandora application represents a severe compromise of integrity and confidentiality principles central to secure web application design standards such as OWASP Top Ten guidelines regarding injection attacks.
The remediation strategy implemented by the developers addresses these issues through structural changes in how data is passed between HTML elements and JavaScript functions. Instead of embedding raw observable values directly into inline event handlers, the patch moves this data storage to dedicated HTML5 data attributes using the dataset API. This separation ensures that user input remains strictly as static content rather than executable code during rendering phases. Additionally, developers replaced instances of innerHTML with textContent across related components, providing defensive hardening against other potential injection vectors by ensuring that dynamic content is always treated as plain text rather than parsed markup or script elements.